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Abstract 
 
 
 
Free speech and free expression are values that are highly prized in 
western society. The mention of removing or altering that right creates 
great debate. In 2004 a Select Committee was set up to inquire into 
what New Zealand’s stance on Hate Speech should be. The 
submissions to that committee made it clear that free expression was a 
highly held right in New Zealand. While the submitters were 
overwhelming opposed to any legislation, it was clear that many had no 
understanding of what hate speech was, and why people would want to 
restrict it. The select Committee needed to provide the public with more 
information about what was intended and what the international situation 
is. If nothing else this thesis should provide that comprehensive 
background information to ground any further debate. 
 
This thesis makes a policy recommendation for the New Zealand 
Government. The policy that is examined and contrasted with 
international experiences is that of hate speech legislation. What should 
New Zealand do in regards to hate speech?  
 
The general debate is examined and the free expression versus 
legislation debate is analysed to provide a comprehensive background 
 to the topic. The reasons why free expression is important to society and 
democracy are examined. Alongside free expression, the harms of hate 
speech are also analysed in order to demonstrate what harm occurs and 
if such harms should be legislated against. 
 
The international situation is contrasted with the New Zealand 
experience. The legislation of the United States, Canada and Australia, 
is analysed in order to compare and contrast with New Zealand’s 
legislation. These three countries are closely aligned with New Zealand 
in terms of language, politics and culture. These countries provide 
equivalent characteristics and are therefore the most useful for 
comparison.  
 
The United States is especially important as it has no hate speech 
legislation and provides a valuable baseline from which the effects of 
legislation can be compared against. 
 
The New Zealand situation is then examined to point out its strengths 
and weaknesses. Where there are weaknesses this thesis recommends 
changes that could be made in varying political circumstances.  
 
Hate speech and free speech issues are not largely discussed in New 
Zealand literature and scholarly work. This thesis follows some work that 
has been previously done on the topic in New Zealand. The bulk of the 
work written about hate speech and free speech issues has been 
completed internationally and needs to be adjusted to fit the New 
Zealand situation. This recommendation has gone some way to doing 
that.  
 
An area of particular interest in this paper is the categories of people 
that deserve protection. Historically just ‘race’ has been provided 
 protection from hate speech in New Zealand and this thesis examines 
why. Central to this investigation is why other categories are not 
protected. 
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Rocks Can Turn to Sand and be Washed Away but Words Last 
Forever:1 A Policy Recommendation for New Zealand’s Vilification 
Legislation. 
 
Chapter One 
 
To be hated, despised, and alone is the 
ultimate fear of all human beings.2
 
The Policy Problem 
 
New Zealand has legislation protecting its citizens from hate speech or 
vilification in a narrowly defined field. Citizens are only protected from 
hate speech or vilification if it is targeted at them because of their colour, 
race, nationality, or ethnicity. This policy recommendation analysed 
legislation internationally to ascertain if New Zealand’s legislation is 
effective and useful, and also if the legislation should be altered in any 
way. 
                                                 
1 A Samoan proverb (ua pala le ma’a ae le pala le upu). The proverb means that actions are 
unimportant and soon forgotten but that words last forever. In Catherine Lane West-Newman,  
Reading Hate Speech From The Bottom In Aotearoa: Subjectivity, Empathy, Cultural 
Difference [2001] Waikato Law Review vol 9 258. 
2 Kathleen Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression (U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 789: 1996) p. 8. 
  
Hate speech and vilification need to be prevented because they cause 
harm to society. The government has a responsibility to protect its 
weakest and most vulnerable citizens from harm. “The most 
fundamental purpose of any system of law is to protect humanity's basic 
existence. If it cannot or will not, then it too, is likely on the path of 
extinction.”3
 
There are two recommendations, first what should be done, and 
secondly what recommendations are likely to be achieved in the current 
political climate (2007).  
 
1.1 Recommendation One, What Should be Done 
 
1.1 Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) should be 
extended to cover all groups provided protection by the HRA from 
discrimination. 
 
1.2 Section 61 of the HRA should be amended to include all protected 
groups under section 21 of the HRA that are not voluntary. These 
groups should include; sex, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
Section 61 should retain its high threshold.  
 
1.3 The scope of the HRA should be extended to cover all means of 
communicating hate messages. 
 
1.4 The Human Rights Commission should be given the directive to 
track hate crimes so that analysts will have the data necessary to see if 
the legislation is effective or not.  
                                                 
3 Kathleen Mahoney, Hate Vilification legislation With Freedom of Expression: Where is the 
Balance? (Ethnic Affairs Commission of New South Wales, Australia: 1994) p. 3. 
  
1.5 Aspects of the framework surrounding the complaints process of the 
Human Rights Commission should be altered to create a transparent 
process and also to aid complainants understanding of what constitutes 
an appropriate complaint.  
 
1.2 Recommendation Two, What Can be Done 
 
The current make-up of the government is not conducive to passing any 
legislation to give more scope to the HRA. Therefore the following 
actions would ensure that the current system runs more efficiently, while 
gathering information to strengthen arguments for expanding the 
legislation in the future. 
 
2.1 The government should give the directive for the HRA to become a 
monitoring agency. The HRA should track hate crimes and gather 
statistics so that the raw data is available to future analysts. With the 
raw data it would be easier to show that enlarging the scope of hate 
speech would fit into the Oakes test demonstrating a substantial and 
pressing need. Without the raw data and with only anecdotal evidence4 
to convince detractors demonstrating a pressing need is unnecessarily 
difficult. 
 
2.2 All other options as highlighted in recommendation one, should be 
implemented if possible. If not, then the changes should be prepared in 
case there is a policy failure. A policy failure could be anything from a 
mass rally out rightly calling for the death of all homosexuals in New 
Zealand, to groups encouraging vilification on a large scale and violence 
then being committed against a group in substantial numbers. “In 
today’s climate of ‘Political Correctness’ and ‘PC Backlash’ laws and 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 4. 
 programs enacted for seemingly good reason will only be taken 
seriously if there is a critical mass with access to those good reasons”5. 
As there is currently no critical mass the legislation would again be 
difficult to convince to those opposed to any government.  
 
2.3 The structure surrounding the HRA should become more 
transparent. The results of complaints, conciliation, and court cases 
should be made public, and readily available. The public need to be 
aware that they can complain under the HRA. More importantly 
however, is that the public be made aware of the fact that they can 
complain to the police if they are vilified in anyway. This means the 
police may need more training to be sensitive to hate speech issues. 
 
1.3 Definitions 
 
Hate speech is a communication via speech, or any other 
communicative medium, that conveys a derogatory, insulting, and 
offensive message. The message must be expressed to an audience, 
and must offend not only a person but a specific group that the person 
belongs to. The message also encourages others to hate that group. 
There are other definitions. In fact Karl Du Fresne claims that: [Hate 
speech] is one of those wondrously loaded phrases, like ‘social justice’, 
that can mean whatever the user wants it to mean.”6 The fluid nature of 
any definition has caused problems in some instances and certain New 
Zealand reports have avoided defining hate speech altogether. Further 
definitions will be provided within the legislation discussed in Chapters 
Three and Four. This paper will use the phrases ‘hate speech’ and 
‘vilification’ interchangeably unless otherwise stated. 
                                                 
5 Submission to the Government Administration Select Committee on the Inquiry Into Hate 
Speech 2004, Submission 111W by CCS. p. 5. 
6 Karl Du Fresne “Hate Speech” (2003) Lost in the Matrix 
http://www.investigatemagazine.com/jun03matrix.htm (last accessed 26 February 2007). 
  
To understand the entire issue, this paper will examine the debate 
surrounding the limitations governments may place on speech. The 
international experience will be studied. New Zealand’s current 
legislation will also be critically analyzed, in order to demonstrate why 
these recommendations are necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
How Free is Free Speech?  An Overview of the Free Speech Versus 
Vilification Law Debate. 
 
Freedom of expression or free speech is a fundamental human right. 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of human rights states, “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”7 Free speech must exist in a democratic society in order for 
the political landscape to be fair. In the United States free speech is 
protected under the first amendment of the bill of rights it states, 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances."8 The bill of rights 
was a founding document in the United States created in 1789. In New 
                                                 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
8 The United States Constitution 1787. 
 Zealand free speech is protected under the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
declares, “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including 
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any 
kind in any form.”9  
 
When we call anything a person’s right, we 
mean that he has a valid claim on society to 
protect him in the possession of it, either by the 
force of law, or by that of education and 
opinion. If he has what we consider a sufficient 
claim, on whatever account, to have something 
guaranteed to him by society, we say that he 
has a right to it.10
 
2.1 Why do we Need Free Speech? 
 
Before it can be argued that any limitations on free speech can be 
justified one needs to understand why free speech is necessary to 
society. No freedoms or rights are absolute, laws are required to 
prescribe to society what one may or may not do, and what others may 
or may not do. Our freedoms should extend so much that individuals 
can do as much as possible without infringing on another. Gaining this 
balance is the job of legislature. “The optimal level of freedom is attained 
when the freedom of each individual is consistent with that of every 
other individual.”11 Freedoms can be thought of as belonging to two 
categories, ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. The freedom to do 
something must not infringe on someone else’s freedom from that 
                                                 
9 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
10 John Stuart Mill in Alan Harworth, Free Speech (Routledge, New York: 1998). p. 72. 
11 Alan R. Regel, "Hate Propaganda:  A Reason to Limit Freedom of Speech" (1984-85), 49 
Sask. L. Rev. 303 p. 304. 
 activity. For example we are free to move about, but we have freedom 
from restriction of movement by others movements.  
 
Freedom is linked to responsibility; when enjoying a freedom one bears 
the burden of responsibility not to infringe on another’s freedom. It is 
obvious that certain rights can come into conflict. In the case of hate 
speech or hateful expression, a common way of describing this clash of 
rights is that of balance. Two conflicting rights need to be weighed 
against each other in order to achieve the optimal balance that which 
allows the greatest amount of freedom.  
 
There are two kinds of arguments for free speech. Consequentialist 
arguments are when the reason for protecting speech is that it will result 
in a positive outcome, while limiting speech will result in a negative 
outcome. Nonconsequentialist arguments are those where autonomy is 
generally put forward as the reason to protect free speech. Autonomy 
being defined as that “which maintains that not to honour an individual’s 
choice to speak – or to receive others speech – would violate that 
persons right to autonomy”12. Autonomy is the individuals right to be 
free of governmental interference.  
 
The most common argument for free speech is based on the ideals of 
democracy. In a democracy, people vote for their leaders. In order to 
vote the people need to know all they can about the candidates and the 
only way they can learn everything about them and their platforms is if 
there is free speech. Without free expression and the dissemination of 
ideas, people will not be able to obtain an accurate picture of a party 
and their votes will be ill-informed. Therefore any restrictions on free 
speech would alter the democratic process. From this argument it has 
been suggested that free speech is the ‘cornerstone of democracy’, 
                                                 
12 Susan J. Brisson, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, p. 322. 
 meaning that “since free speech is part of the legislative process itself, 
any restrictions upon it would alter the democratic process”.13 Free 
speech is the only way that contenders are able to fully express their 
platforms and as such is an essential aspect of democracy.  
 
Free speech also offers citizens a way to help prevent the state from 
subverting other rights and freedoms. If for example it is illegal to 
criticise a government, such restrictions would make it easier for that 
government to impose limitations on other freedoms. 14
 
This political reasoning is based partly on John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’. 
Mill is the prominent figure in free speech debates, his works and ideas 
are consistently referenced in all texts discussing hate speech. Mill’s 
argument against restricting speech can be broken down into three 
premises. 
 
1. The suppressed opinion may be true, and the accepted beliefs in 
error. 
2. Even if true, accepted beliefs become mere prejudices if 
unchallenged and untested. 
3. There is likely to be some basis for all opinion. (Mill, On Liberty, 
1858)15 
 
 
Analysts of Mill coined the phrase ‘the marketplace of ideas’. The 
marketplace of ideas is essentially that with free speech all ideas and 
opinions are presented and because people are rational calculating 
                                                 
13 Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, 
(Cohen Committee).Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966. 
 
14 R. V. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; reversing (1988) 60 Alta.L.R. (2d) 1; reversing (1984) 
19 C.C.C. (3d) 254. 
15 In, Tim McBride, New Zealand Civil Rights Handbook: A Guide to your Civil Rights Under 
New Zealand Law (Legal Information Services Inc, Auckland: 2001) p. 9/1. 
 beings the truth will come out and society will benefit. Without the free 
exchange of ideas, the truth may not be as easily discovered, or as 
Mill’s puts it “if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity 
for exchanging error for truth: if wrong they lose what is almost as great 
a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced 
by its collusion with error.”16 So, if free expression is limited the 
marketplace may miss out on truths and as such the marketplace will 
keep believing errors, but more importantly, false ideas or erroneous 
ideas make the truth more vivid and obvious. This concept is also seen 
in the writings of John Milton where he says, “Let [truth] and falsehood 
grapple, who ever knew [t]ruth put to the worse, in a free and open 
encounter”17. This statement is popular amongst those who are in 
opposition to hate speech laws.18 The statement taken out of context is 
quite direct and convincing.  
 
Unfortunately most people are not rational calculating beings. In the 
marketplace of ideas the truth does not always rise to the surface, and 
not everyone has the same access to the marketplace. Regel discussing 
Mills marketplace of ideas says,  
 
This position is based on the dubious 
assumption that the public are essentially 
rational calculating beings – that the majority 
will sift through the rhetoric to the logical 
skeleton of the argument in order to examine it 
on its merits – that they will reject the position if 
                                                 
16 John Stuart Mill, “The tyranny of the Majority” in Philosophy for a new generation 
17 J. Milton, Areopagitica (1644) reprinted in II Complete Prose Works of John Milton 485, 561 
(E. Sirluck ed. 1959) (modern spelling used). 
18 Submission to the  Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry Into Hate Speech, Submission 
5W by J. N. Biriss. 
 the argument is unsound, and accept it if 
sound.19
 
Psychologists contend that people often do not make optimal decisions 
and they also often do not reason logically either.20 People use mental 
shortcuts to get things done quickly and efficiently. Experiments have 
shown that we know logically how to make optimal decisions people just 
do not take the time to do that. Emotions over ride logic and people’s 
upbringing, environment and experiences effect their thought patterns.21 
For example if people think that Asians are bad drivers, they see one 
Asian person driving badly and it confirms their suspicions. The amount 
of bad drivers of differing races they encounter has no effect on this 
belief if it is held strongly, that one bad Asian driver fulfils their own 
prophecy.  
 
A common example of erroneous belief instilled in the public is the 
German populace during WWII, the Germans were rational people, but 
accepted irrational propositions as the truth 
 
People will search for and interpret information which reinforces their 
own beliefs. This is called ‘Confirmation Bias’ closely related to 
‘cognitive dissonance’. Cognitive dissonance was proposed by Leon 
Festinger. Festinger theorises that, “It is psychologically uncomfortable 
to hold contradictory cognitions.”22 People do not involve themselves 
fully in the marketplace of ideas. Confirmation Bias is where people 
search for information that affirms already set beliefs, any contradictory 
information is not rationalised is simply discarded or interpreted in a 
                                                 
19 Regel, p. 307. 
20 Daniel T. Willingham, Cognition the Thinking Animal, Second Edition (Pearson Education 
Inc, New Jersey, USA: 2004) p. 366. 
21 Ibid, p. 366 
22 Graham M. Vaughan and Michael a. Hogg, Introduction to Social Psychology (Pearson 
Education, Australia: 2005) p. 146-54. 
 different way. So psychologically people are not able to participate in the 
exchange of ideas in a way that Mill would have wanted. This means 
that the marketplace is not the best way to alter or change already 
preconceived ideas. 
 
If free speech is essential for democracy then one can logically conclude 
that political speech should not be restricted. Canada for example 
decided this in Switzman v. Ebling and A.G. of Quebec. In this decision 
a law banning communist activities was overturned.23 It does not follow 
from the argument that free speech is important to democracy, that non-
political speech is also exempt from restrictions.  
 
Thomas Emerson put forward three arguments for free speech. 
 
1. Attainment of truth – suppression of information or discussion 
…blocks the generation of new ideas, and tends to perpetrate 
error. 
2. Individual self fulfillment – thought and communication are the 
fountainhead of all expression of the individual personality. 
3. Balance between stability and change – suppression of 
expression conceals the real problems confronting society and 
diverts public attention from the critical issues. (The system of 
freedom of expression, 1970)24 
 
The argument for free speech from individual self fulfilment for is that it 
offers “the value of individual autonomy experienced in self-actualization 
through speech.”25 The arguments from autonomy are 
nonconsequentialist where autonomy is ultimately ‘good’ and if the 
                                                 
23 Switzman v. Elbling [1957] S.C.R. 285. 
24 McBride, p. 9/1. 
25 Catherine Lane West-Newman, ‘Reading Hate Speech From the Bottom in Aotearoa: 
Subjectivity, Empathy, Cultural Difference’ Waikato Law Review [2001] vol 9 231-264 p. 236. 
 government acts to remove autonomy that is ‘bad’. Justifications from 
autonomy are put forward for; the right to vote, the right to be free from 
taxation, the right to contraception, abortion, the right to freedom of 
religion, and of course the right to free speech. In America, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall said “the First Amendment (free speech) serves not 
only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit — a spirit 
that demands self-expression.”26  
 
Not being able to express ones self means that that person may not be 
able to fully develop their personal identity. People need to discuss and 
transfer ideas in order to create an opinion on differing subjects. When 
these opinions are then expressed, part of the expression illustrates that 
person’s character. 
 
While being persuasive, arguments that free speech is ultimately good 
for the public is no reason that limits cannot be placed on free speech, 
even under autonomous justification for free speech.27  This is because, 
hate speech would violate the victims’ rights to equality and equality can 
also be argued for through autonomy. 
 
Free speech is important to democracy for individual fulfillment, and for 
the attainment of truth. Without it society is handicapped. Societies in 
the modern world who do not have free speech suffer from a lack of 
development in technology, academia and socially. A brief comparison 
is that of the Arab states, they are all run by dictators, and they are 
extremely unproductive countries with restrictive laws on freedom of 
                                                 
26 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
27 For a complete overview of the arguments for autonomy and reasons limits can be placed on 
free speech see Suan J. Brisson, “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech”, Ethics, Vol. 108, 
No. 2 (Jan., 1998), 312-339. 
 expression. 28 To maintain a productive society free speech is very 
important and should only be restricted if the need is great. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Limits on Free Speech: 
 
“...the very simple principle’ that ‘the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’”.29
 
No nation state offers its citizens absolute freedom of expression. Even 
in the United States, which has the most liberal of speech laws, there 
are still restrictions on speech, including obscenity, fighting words, 
commercial speech, and incitement and libel/slander. In Australia, 
legislation restricts speech on “public defamation, blasphemy, 
confidentiality obligations associated with employment, copyright, 
contempt, incitement, official secrecy, sedition and noise pollution.”30  
 
Legislation restricting free speech is required to maintain the balance 
between being free to and being free from. So while not being absolute 
(very few if any people want it to be absolute), it is still a vitally important 
right that should not be infringed upon unless absolutely necessary.  
 
The rationale put forward for legislating against hate speech or 
vilification, is harm. Mill supported the argument that if speech causes 
                                                 
28 See Bernard Lewis, The crisis of Islam (Modern library, New York: 2003). 
29 John Sturat Mill On Liberty in Haworth p. 30. 
30 Mandy Tibbey, "Developments on Anti-Vilification Law", Australian Bar Review, 8 August 
2001,     1-40. p. 2. 
 harm it should be prevented. Governments have a requirement to 
prevent harm where possible. Governments also have the responsibility 
of promoting, protecting, and providing for the general welfare of all the 
people. It is accepted generally by both sides of the debate that hate 
speech does cause harm to its victims. The main discussion revolves 
around if such harm needs to be legislated against. For example David 
Goldberger who was the lead counsel in the American Civil Liberties 
Union case defended neo-Nazis who marched in Skokie, Illinois. 
Goldberger compared the harm of hate speech to the harm of a long 
term partner leaving a relationship for their partner’s best friend. He 
describes it as a crippling harm, which causes mental anguish, but is not 
legislated against.31 The level or degree of harm is what is under 
debate. Should mental anguish and degradation be legislature worthy 
harm? Many different types of harm are legislated against already in 
terms of speech. Even though both sides of the debate internationally 
concede that harm is caused it is not widely accepted that hate speech 
causes harm amongst the general population in New Zealand.32  
 
Kathleen Mahoney believes that the reason Canada has enacted hate 
speech legislation while America has not, is because Canadians place 
an emphasis on collective human rights, while the United States places 
an emphasis on individual rights.33 Mahoney says “Increasing 
recognition of the right of everyone to free and equal treatment is 
apparent in legislation and case law, and there is growing acceptance of 
the view that an egalitarian society may be impossible to achieve when 
the dissemination of racist ideas is permitted.”34 Mahoney also 
questions how something can be seen as a freedom “when it is 
simultaneously experienced by another as violence, oppression, 
                                                 
31 Symposium, "Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American 
Perspectives on Group Defamation", (1988-89), 37 Buffalo Law Review, No. 2, p. 366. 
32 Based on the Submissions to the  Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry Into Hate Speech. 
33 Symposium, p. 345. 
34 Ibid p. 345. 
 containment, or some other variation of non-freedom.”35 Ironically it is 
through free speech that these minority groups have been able to point 
out that this specific freedom is what is degrading and humiliating them.  
 
Free expression is important for democracy. However, hate speech 
causes groups of people to withdraw from society and therefore conflicts 
with the ideals of democracy. 
 
The preamble for the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) in 
describing the harm of racial vilification states: 
 
Vilifying conduct is contrary to democratic 
values because of its effect on people of 
diverse ethnic, indigenous and religious 
backgrounds. It diminishes their dignity, sense 
of self-worth and belonging to the community. It 
also reduces their ability to contribute to, or fully 
participate in, all social, political, economic and 
cultural aspects of society as equals, thus 
reducing the benefit that diversity brings to the 
community.36
 
Within the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act it can be seen that hate 
speech is contrary to democratic values. Such speech reduces the 
victims’ participation within society, whereas free speech is supposed to 
allow everyone to access the political world. Diminishing a person’s 
sense of worth, dignity and belonging to a community are seen as 
harms by this act. Such harm is not passed off as merely taking offence, 
                                                 
35 Ibid p. 346. 
36 Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) 
 but as real tangible harm. The act also recognises that hate speech 
reduces a person or groups participation is society, reducing the benefit 
that diversity can bring.  
 
 
 
 
2.3 The Harms of Vilification 
 
The direct harms and societal harms of hate speech can be viewed 
through personal testimonies and through the high rates of suicide, 
depression, drug abuse, domestic violence, and anti-social behaviour 
present in many minority groups. “Cultural alienation is frequently given 
as an explanation for indigenous populations having higher rates of drug 
and alcohol abuse and mental health problems including depression and 
suicide.”37 Queer teens also have higher suicide rates than their 
heterosexual contemporaries.38 Drug use is higher than the norm 
amongst minority groups; racism and vilification contribute to minorities 
feeling separated, dejected and alone. 
 
Wojciech Sadurski submits that there are three main types of harm as a 
result of racial vilification or hate speech. First is harm as a result of a 
violent reaction to what was said.  Second is violence from those who 
hear the vilification and therefore attack the people being vilified. Third is 
the harm that results from just the words themselves. Sadurski 
                                                 
37 Teiho - Disparities In Maori Mental Health 
http://www.teiho.org/Epidemiology/DisparitiesInMaoriMentalHealth.aspx (last accessed 14 
March 2007). 
38 D. M. Fergusson, J. Horwood, A. L. Beatrais, Is Sexual Orientation Related to Mental Health 
Problems and Suicidality in Young People? (1999) 56 Arch Gen Psychiatry p. 876. 
 recognises other types of harm. She mentions societal harm, meaning 
that the utterance of hate speech damages society as well as the victim 
of the speech. The speech “degrades the standards of everyday life, of 
civility, of ‘the quality of public discourse’. Further it threatens social 
peace and harmony, and the society as a whole suffers as a result.”39
 
Mari Matsuda suggests that vilification and racism change the whole 
social dynamic. Matsuda provides an example of visiting Perth in the 
1980s when right wing groups went on sustained graffiti and poster 
campaigns. These posters said “Asians Out or Racial War”.  Matsuda 
found all of her interactions with people were coloured by these posters. 
She says “I found myself being super polite, using educated inflection so 
that people wouldn’t confuse me with those “other” Asians. If people 
were rude to me, I had to stop and think, now is this plain old ordinary 
rudeness or is this racism?”40 The overt racism portrayed by the graffiti 
and posters changed the way she behaved, she felt that she needed to 
try and be something more and better, to please the racists. That is an 
example of not being free. The posters would also have had an effect on 
the non-Asian residents of the area as well. They might try to be extra 
nice, extra polite and welcoming towards Asians, or other vilified groups 
so the vilified group they come into contact with will know that they are 
not like that, they are not like the people who put the posters up.  The 
cliché defence that people have when accused of being a racist/bigot is 
‘I’m not a racist/bigot I have an Asian (or other minority group) friend’. 
The association that the person has that one friend demonstrates that 
they are not racist or bigoted. This feeling that non-minority people have 
that they need to be extra sensitive towards minorities may come when 
people from a dominant group hear racist jokes or other vilifying 
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 language, and the first thought that comes to mind is, ‘thank goodness 
that’s not me’.41
 
Another social cost is that once this idea has been planted in the minds 
of people it is hard to remove. The thought needs constant rejection. 
When interactions between people take place those thoughts rise to the 
surface immediately, for example the Asian driver. Matsuda gives the 
example of when she was studying hate speech she read some 
literature from a group named ‘dot busters’. This group was anti-Indian, 
and the next time she saw an Indian woman she immediately thought of 
‘dot busters’, not that the lady had a nice sari, or smile, but of ‘dot 
busters’.42
 
Internationally the harm caused by hate speech has been recognised 
and a number of charters have been put forward by the UN for member 
states to sign. These include the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, of which article 20(2) states, “Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” This convention has 
been ratified by New Zealand, including a reservation that they had 
already legislated against racial or religious hatred. New Zealand is also 
a signatory of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, of which article 4(a) states that state 
parties:  
 
shall declare an offence punishable by law all 
dissemination of ideas based on racial 
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 superiority or hatred, incitement to racial 
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or 
group of persons of another colour or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of any assistance 
to racist activities, including the financing 
thereof. 43
 
The fact that New Zealand has ratified both these charters and passed 
legislation shows that they believe that harm can be caused through 
hate speech towards racial and religious groups. As New Zealand 
already has such legislation this means the government appreciates that 
speech can cause harm and as such an expansion of the current 
legislation to make it more coherent and practical should pose no great 
debate. The debate should revolve around where exactly to draw the 
line between acceptable use of free speech and speech that causes 
harm. 
 
2.4 Arguments Against Vilification Legislation 
 
The doctrine of freedom of expression is generally 
thought to single out a class of ‘protected acts’ 
which it holds to be immune from restrictions to 
which other acts are subject. In particular, on any 
strong version of the doctrine there will be cases 
where protected acts are held to be immune from 
restriction despite the fact that they have as 
consequences harms which would normally be 
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 sufficient to justify the imposition of legal 
sanctions.44
 
 
 
 
2.5 The Slippery Slope 
 
There are several widely popular but easily dismissible arguments 
presented against hate speech legislation. Perhaps the most popular is 
that of a slippery slope. A basic overview of the argument is, if we allow 
this legislation to pass, eventually the definition of what constitutes 
vilification or hate speech will grow so broad that all speech will be 
stifled and we will end up living in a totalitarian state. This view came 
through strongly in the submissions to the select committee on hate 
speech 2004.  
 
Simon Lee does not think much of the slippery slope argument saying, 
“The slippery slope argument is used as a trump card in so many 
debates on free speech issues that it is often assumed to be a clinching 
move when it is in fact far from convincing”.45 An analogy used is that if 
we have free speech we will be at the top of a mountain. To take away 
part of that freedom will move us to the slope where free speech will 
eventually slide to the bottom. One quickly realises that we are never at 
the top of the mountain. In every country there are restrictions on what 
may be said in public. So we are already part way down the slope, and 
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 yet we have failed to slide to the bottom. Lee also describes the 
argument as the ‘horrible results’ claim. To prevent hate speech, will, no 
matter how good your intentions, eventually lead to a horrible result. Or 
there is the ‘arbitrary results’ claim, which was very popular in the 
submissions to the select committee. This argument states that the 
issue of speech is so complex that it will be too hard to draw a line 
defining what is allowed and what is not, which leads again to the 
slippery slope and once again this argument is easily refuted.46 Lines 
are drawn all the time in legislature. Laws decide what speeds are 
appropriate while driving, at what age one may do something, even 
though someone is one day short of doing something, we can still draw 
the line. 
 
A counter against the slippery slope stance is the international situation. 
Canada has had tough hate speech legislation for over 20 years. Before 
the law was enacted the Canadian Civil Liberties Association also 
thought that the laws would lead to abuse and the slippery slope. That 
has not happened.47  Barry Brown believes the mentality that hate 
speech laws are out to get you is unfounded and that if one takes a 
fresh look at the problem they can see why it is so. In Canada, Brown 
submits that the legislation is there to “uphold society’s commitment to 
tolerance.”48 In essence the legislation is there to support a principle, 
not to restrict one, he sees the legislation as upholding, section 15 (the 
right to equality), and 27 (judicial responsibility to enhance 
multiculturalism) of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedom.49
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 A final argument against the slippery slope argument can be seen in 
parallels with previous legislation. For example here in New Zealand we 
have many laws restricting freedom of expression. None of those have 
spread out and become all encompassing. The laws have remained 
there for the purpose they were enacted for. For example the law 
against defamation has not spread out until society can no longer say 
anything bad about anyone else. There is still a robust media who can 
parody and satire anyone they like. The slippery slope argument just 
does not hold up to scrutiny. 
 
Society does need to be careful when constructing hate speech 
legislation. The boundaries will be tested and the scope of such laws 
should be kept narrow. In the next chapter I will discuss some problems 
Canada has had with limiting the scope of their law, and discuss how 
New Zealand can avoid such broadness. However, none of what has 
happened in Canada has resulted in a ‘horrible result’.  
 
2.6 Tolerance 
 
The second commonly submitted argument against Hate Speech 
legislation is from the basis of tolerance and holds that tolerating 
multiple viewpoints is a vital aspect of a healthy society. This argument 
generally submits that hate speech is obnoxious or offensive, but not 
harmful as such. For example, “We need freedom to talk and debate on 
theological issues, and we all need to be big enough to handle an 
opposing point of view even if it offends.”50 This argument and David 
Goldberger’s argument that hate speech is the same harm as a lover 
leaving you, miss the point. Hate speech is not offensive or obnoxious; it 
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 is not synonymous with mental anguish over having a lover leave you. 
Hate, racism and bigotry are everyday events for minorities. People of 
these groups already know that society views them differently and every 
time they are exposed to hate speech it reinforces their second class 
status in society. Psychologist Kenneth Clark says, “Human beings … 
whose daily experience tells them that almost nowhere in society are 
they respected and granted the ordinary dignity and courtesy accorded 
to others will, as a matter of course, begin to doubt their own worth”.51  
“Members of minority groups may come to believe the stereotypes about 
them, that they are lazy, dirty, stupid, etc”.  “The accumulation of 
negative images … present[s] them with one massive and destructive 
choice: either hate one’s self, as culture so systematically demand[s], or 
have no self at all, to be nothing.”52 Clearly from such descriptions these 
people should not have to bear the burden of tolerance, and this harm is 
much more than a single event like a partner leaving you. 
 
A third argument against legislation is that such legislation would give 
bigots a soapbox on which they can reach a greater audience than if we 
left them alone. However, the victims of hate speech see a system 
where it is acceptable to demean and degrade them through speech. 
Opponents to hate speech legislation claim that by prosecuting people 
who use hate speech society is giving them a soapbox where they can 
disseminate their message to a far wider audience. An example of this 
was the Zundel case in Canada. Zundel was charged with disseminating 
Holocaust denial literature. As Zundel was charged under section 181, 
an offence of spreading false news, he was able to try and prove that his 
theories were not false and as such used the court as a soapbox to 
publicly disseminate Holocaust denial ideas.53  
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 The Zundel trial was extensively covered by the media. After the trial 
research was conducted to see how Zundel’s ideas had affected 
Canadians. The research concluded that as a result of Zundel's trial 
sympathy for Zundel had not increased.  Anti-Semitism had also not 
increased in Canada.54  
 
Opponents of legislation on the other hand present a John Stuart Mill 
claim that when the audience (society) hears hate speech or ideas that 
are clearly wrong, those ideas help illuminate the correct ideas. 
However in the case of hate speech, by allowing these ideas to help 
illuminate the truth, they are at the same time causing harm and causing 
rifts in society. For all the defamed group sees is that the speaker is free 
to attack them, and they are powerless to respond. Perhaps legislation 
provides us with a solution to this problem. By prosecuting bigots who 
use hateful speech we are giving them a soapbox to present their ideas. 
These ideas help illuminate the truth so that society can see how 
ridiculous these ideas are, while at the same time the defamed group is 
aware that society respects them and are punishing the parties who use 
hate speech. Observers can see the illuminated idea, the truth, being 
contrasted with a false idea (hate speech) which is being punished. This 
is the optimal result. Due to the fact that racists and bigots already use 
the internet to distribute information it is unlikely that by prosecuting hate 
speech society is giving these people a larger soapbox to people 
already receptive to their ideas. 
 
A large number of the submissions to the select committee on hate 
speech felt there was no need for such legislation. The submissions 
proclaimed that New Zealand is a vibrant tolerant society and such 
things (hate speech) do not happen here.   Mari Matsuda sees this as a 
                                                 
54 Weiman and Winn Hate on Trial: The Zundel Affair, the Media and Public Opinion in 
Canada (Oakulle: Mosaic Press, 1986)  
 typical response in America as well. The dominant group sees hate 
speech as harmless but obnoxious, the product of sick but harmless 
minds, not like theirs. Matsuda believes this to be a defensive reaction 
“a refusal to believe that real people, people just like us, are racists. This 
dissociation leads logically to the claim that there is no institutional or 
state responsibility to respond to the incident. It is not the kind of real 
and persuasive threat that requires the states power to quell”55. This 
attitude was plainly obvious in the select committee submissions, hate 
speech legislation was attacked and considered to be “social 
engineering”56, or that “The tools of the state are powerful and heavy, 
but are not suitable for the fine distinctions or[of] social surgery.”57 
Others commented that society would censor itself “We can identify and 
reject hate language without bureaucrats to do this for us, especially 
politically correct bureaucrats”.58 None of the submissions making these 
claims attempted to describe how society would identify and reject hate 
language. If legislation is needed for society to be protected from false 
advertising it stands to reason that society can not always determine 
fact from fiction. 
 
2.7 Where is the Balance? 
 
The main issue is that of balance. There are two conflicting values, 
Freedom of expression, and the right to equality.  
 
There are only individual people, different 
individual people, with their own individual lives. 
Using one of these people for the benefit of others, 
uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. 
                                                 
55 Matsuda p. 20. 
56 Submission 3W by Kevin Marshall. 
57 Submission 7W by Paul Clarke. 
58 Submission 5W by J.N. Biriss. 
 What happens is that something is done to him for 
the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good 
covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in 
this way does not sufficiently respect and take 
account of the fact that he is a separate person, 
that his is the only life he has. He does not get 
some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and 
no one is entitled to force this upon him.59
 
Forcing minorities to be degraded, to allow a greater social good, free 
speech, is wrong. Sir Isaiah Berlin describes the dilemma.  
 
Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice or culture, or 
human happiness or a quiet conscience. If the 
liberty of myself or my class or nation depends 
on the misery of a number of other human 
beings, the system which promotes them is 
unjust and immoral. But if I curtail or lose my 
freedom, in order to lessen the shame of such 
inequality, and do not thereby materially 
increase the individual liberty of others, an 
absolute loss of liberty occurs. This may be 
compensated for by a gain in justice or in 
happiness or in peace, but the loss remains.60
 
This passage accurately describes why hate speech legislation is 
necessary while at the same time illustrating the fears opponents of 
such legislation have.  
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“If the liberty of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a 
number of other human beings, the system which promotes them is 
unjust.” Therefore if a system advocates free speech above all else, 
minorities suffer. For example Phelps is a prominent anti-homosexual 
campaigner, he and his groups picket gay funerals. Such activities 
cause misery and hurt, but are covered by the first amendment in the 
United States. When anti-war activists picketed military funerals in the 
United States a law was quickly passed to prevent such activity, gay 
people are unfortunately not provided the same protection. The excerpt 
maintains that using one liberty to harm another is wrong.  
 
In the next sentence Berlin describes the possible ‘horrible result’ that 
such restrictions could bring. “But if I curtail or lose my freedom, in order 
to lessen the shame of such inequality, and do not thereby materially 
increase the individual liberty of others, an absolute loss of liberty 
occurs.” If hate speech legislation is enacted and society’s speech is 
overly chilled without minorities gaining any sort of equality in society 
then nothing has been achieved except a loss of liberty.  
 
The last sentence describes that society may be happier or more 
peaceful, but its citizens do not have liberty. So Berlin has encapsulated 
the free speech problem, where do we draw the line, and if we draw the 
line, will it help or harm society? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Comparing Apples to Oranges: An Examination of Relevant 
International Legislation. 
 
In order to properly analyse New Zealand’s hate speech legislation, 
including what should happen to it, if anything, it is necessary to 
examine similar legislation, or lack of, internationally from countries that 
closely resemble New Zealand. For this purpose I have selected three 
countries that are typically associated with New Zealand, The United 
States, Australia and Canada. All three are Pacific Anglo European 
countries with related legal systems and contain comparable cultural 
values. 
 
The United States has the most stringent free speech values of any 
country. Its Bill of Rights is part of its constitution. Within the Bill of 
Rights freedom of expression is the supreme right and the first 
amendment. A possible reason that the right to free speech is held so 
highly could be that the United States government was formed from 
violence where as the nation states of New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada were not. Roslyn Atkinson comments that for countries which 
 had to free themselves violently from oppressive regimes, liberty and the 
rights of men are held to high importance. For example, France and the 
United States both had violent beginnings to their democracies. As such 
they had idealist views and created their founding documents to 
maintain what they had fought so hard to achieve.61 This is most 
obvious in the case of the United States and their constitution. Freedom 
of expression was considered the backbone of a democratic society and 
so became the first amendment of the constitution. 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century countries achieving their 
independence from, for example Great Britain, were not obliged to go to 
war or engage in bloody revolution to achieve that independence.  
Consequently, their constitutions such as those of Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, revealed a more complacent view of the need to 
protect human rights constitutionally or by legislation and a greater belief 
in the power of the common law. This complacent view was eventually 
shattered by the two world wars. The wars proved that seemingly 
intelligent people could discriminate against specific groups of people 
based on their race and religion and then set out to systematically 
destroy those people.  
 
The Holocaust was certainly a catalyst for the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Article two of 
which states, “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status”62. The article reinforces the 
idea that all people are equal in rights, hopefully to help prevent an 
atrocity like the Holocaust occurring again. 
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New Zealand and Canada have only recently implemented a Bill of 
Rights. Canada did so within its Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1984 
and New Zealand implemented a Bill of Rights in 1990 with the creation 
of its Bill of Rights Act, which is not entrenched.63 These documents are 
important because any legislation concerning racial vilification and hate 
speech needs to be aware of the competition of rights, and needs to 
ensure that any infringement on rights is minimal. As I will show, racial 
vilification legislation needs to be able to stand up to claims that 
vilification legislation is unconstitutional or that it violates rights. The 
stance of the courts on the balance of vilification versus free speech is 
very important. The first country to be examined is the United States 
where the balance is still in favour of free speech over any cost that hate 
speech may produce.  
 
3.1 The United States 
 
The R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul case is important because it highlights the 
difficulties the courts have with free speech issues.  
 
The first amendment of the constitution states, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” There are in fact restrictions 
on speech in the United States, as previously mentioned. Typically 
speech laws in the United States are liberal.  
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 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul is an example of the libertarian nature of 
American speech legislation. The Supreme Court decided on the issue 
of cross burning, whether it constituted a legitimate expression of free 
speech or if it was unprotected speech. The details of the case were as 
follows: “In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner and several 
other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping 
together broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside 
the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street.”64 Cross 
burning is highly offensive to African Americans. The very action of 
burning a cross invokes memories of slavery, the Klu Klux Klan and 
lynching. Cross burning is an unmistakably racist act. The result of this 
case was that the city of St. Paul had previously enacted a Bias-
motivated Crime Ordinance 1990. This ordinance stated,  
 
Whoever places on public or private property a 
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or 
graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning 
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm, or resentment in others, on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender, commits 
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.65
 
The ordinance was later found to be unconstitutional upon appeal at the 
Court of Appeal, which stated that the statute was too ambiguous.  
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 The Court of Appeal decision was subsequently overturned by the State 
Supreme Court, which found that the cross burning constituted ‘fighting 
words’.  
 
The defense had argued along the lines of ‘fighting words’.  
 
We ask the court to reflect on the ‘content’ the 
‘expressive conduct’ represented by a ‘burning 
cross’. It is no less than the first step in an act of 
racial violence. It was and unfortunately still is 
the equivalent of [the] waving of a knife before 
the thrust, the pointing of a gun before it’s fired, 
the lighting of a match before arson, the 
hanging of the noose before the lynching. It is 
not a political statement, or even a cowardly 
statement of hatred. It is the first step in an act 
of assault. It can be no more protected than 
holding a gun to a victim[‘s] head. It is perhaps 
the ultimate expression of ‘fighting words’.66
 
Fighting words were first considered to be a form of speech unprotected 
by the first amendment via Chaplinksky v. New Hampshire. This case 
held that there are certain classes of speech, including “…the lewd, the 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words 
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace”67. The decision also stated that such 
speech was not part of the “exposition of ideas”68 and no benefit could 
be derived from them.  
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 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul appears to fall under the category created by 
the Chaplinksky case of fighting words. The Supreme Court overturned 
the State Supreme Court decision in 1992. The Supreme court 
determined that cross burning did not constitute ‘fighting words’ but was 
in fact a valid viewpoint in the marketplace of ideas, thus cross burning 
was speech protected by the first amendment. The Chaplinsky case was 
decided in 1942 and the R.A.V. decision in 1990, the differing point of 
view between the two courts demonstrated that the United States has 
become increasingly more noninterventionist in terms of its speech laws. 
The R.A.V. decision has limited the scope of the ‘fighting words’ 
doctrine. ‘Fighting words’ must be delivered face to face and that does 
not happen in the case of cross burnings. 
 
More recently a similar case also sided with the speaker’s right to 
hateful expression. On April 7, 2003 the Supreme Court in Virginia v. 
Black struck down a Virginia law that prohibited cross burning, following 
the lines of R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, the law prohibited burning a cross 
with the, “intent to intimidate a person or group of persons”69.  The 
Virginia case shows that laws can be created to prevent hateful 
expressions like cross burning, yet the law can then be struck down as 
unconstitutional.  This necessary dilemma is there to prevent overly 
broad legislation, showing that laws need to be carefully drafted, narrow, 
and designed to target the problem. For example the Virginia law 
attempted to ban cross burning by using an intent clause, meaning that 
the intent of the cross burning would be to intimidate. Justice Clarence 
Thomas in a dissenting view said: 
 
Accordingly, this statute prohibits only conduct, 
not expression. And, just as one cannot burn 
down someone's house to make a political point 
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 and then seek refuge in the First Amendment, 
those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate 
to make their point. In light of my conclusion that 
the statute here addresses only conduct, there 
is no need to analyze it under any of our First 
Amendment tests. 
 
Justice Thomas is attempting to separate the issue into speech and 
action, claiming that the action of cross burning is not speech and 
therefore no speech tests should be done to ascertain if a violation of 
free speech rights has occurred. While I would agree with his dissenting 
opinion it would be on different grounds. Cross burning is speech, it is 
hateful speech as discussed above. Justice Thomas it seems would 
agree, and puts forward several interesting examples. Justice Thomas 
seems willing to accept the fact that speech does not trump all other 
rights, “That the First Amendment gives way to other interests is not a 
remarkable proposition.” He uses an example of several laws passed 
that revolve around abortion clinics to show that legislation understands 
that there are vulnerable people who are vulnerable to specific speech 
actions. The decision to which he refers70 upheld a law that prevented 
protestors from coming within eight feet of a prospective abortion clinic 
patient. “[E]xplaining that the State had a legitimate interest, which was 
sufficiently narrowly tailored, in protecting those seeking services of 
such establishments ‘from unwanted advice’ and ‘unwanted 
communication’.”71 So, Justice Thomas has agreed with the state 
upholding a law that prevented abortion protesters from coming within 
eight feet of a patient and providing them with unwanted speech, which 
is an infringement on free speech. Yet for some reason cross burning 
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 which causes extreme distress to many people, is deemed acceptable 
by the state.  
 
That cross burning subjects its targets, and, 
sometimes, an unintended audience … to 
extreme emotional distress, and is virtually 
never viewed merely as "unwanted 
communication," but rather, as a physical threat, 
is of no concern to the plurality. Henceforth, 
under the plurality's view, physical safety will be 
valued less than the right to be free from 
unwanted communications. 
 
Justice Thomas also refutes the chilling effect aspect of the legislation. 
The claim being that if cross burning that is intended to cause 
intimidation is banned, then there will be a chilling effect on legitimate 
cross burnings. Any legislation that prohibits an action or activity has the 
potential to cause a chilling effect. The chilling effect is where people are 
fearful of performing legitimate actions or activities because of the 
legislation affecting the prohibited action. I cannot see a reason for a 
legitimate cross burning it seems to me and also to Justice Thomas to 
serve no other purpose than to be “a symbol of hate” and “a symbol of 
white supremacy”.72To refute that a chilling effect occurs Justice 
Thomas references several pornography cases: 
 
Moreover, even in the First Amendment context, 
the Court has upheld such regulations where 
conduct that initially appears culpable, ultimately 
results in dismissed charges. A regulation of 
pornography is one such example. While 
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 possession of child pornography is illegal, 
Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982), 
possession of adult pornography, as long as it is 
not obscene, is allowed, Miller v. California, 413 
U. S. 15 (1973). As a result, those 
pornographers trafficking in images of adults 
who look like minors, may be not only deterred 
but also arrested and prosecuted for possessing 
what a jury might find to be legal materials. This 
"chilling" effect has not, however, been a cause 
for grave concern with respect to overbreadth of 
such statutes among the members of this 
Court.73
 
The chilling effect feared by the cross burning legislation does not take 
place or has not caused great concern in other areas such as 
pornography so why, points out Justice Thomas, should it in the case of 
cross burning? Justice Thomas’ arguments appear to me to be sound, 
pointing out what appears to be double standards and with time perhaps 
changes will occur to the make up of the Supreme Court allowing 
legislation that prevents hate speech. 
 
 
3.2 Speech Codes 
 
The main arena for hate speech discussion in the United States has 
been in Academia. Universities across the United States have attempted 
to implement speech codes in order to give them some power over 
students who may use hate speech against students from minority 
groups.  
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In the absence of governmental protection from hate speech many 
academic institutions in the United States have implemented Speech 
Codes to protect students from injurious speech. These codes are 
designed to prevent hate speech and encourage equality. However 
because of first amendment concerns many Speech Codes have been 
struck down as unconstitutional.74 The University of Michigan’s famous 
speech code attempts to prevent, 
 
Verbal or physical behaviour . . . that 
stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, 
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran 
status. . . and that creates an intimidating, 
hostile or demeaning environment for 
educational pursuits, employment or 
participation in University sponsored extra-
curricular activities.75
  
This code and others like it have been challenged in the courts. Such 
codes are commonplace in the United States now even without legal 
backing. The speech codes have been a great catalyst for debate on 
free speech issues.76
 
The United States shows no interest in passing legislation to ban hate 
speech. A First Amendment ideology has been created in the United 
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 States that will prevent any legislation that would restrict hate speech. 
Stanley Fish believes this is because people do not wish to face the 
alternative which is that people, instead of doctrine, make decisions 
about speech.77 Or, as Gerald Rosenberg said, the “First Amendment is 
not a substantive force in itself, but instead a forum for substantive 
arguments about the cultural definitions of liberty”.78 There is a belief 
that any legislation on hate speech would erode Freedom of Speech, 
but yet “death threats, child pornography, fraud, defamation, and 
invasion of privacy are exempt”79 why is this so? Anthony Cortese 
believes it is because the United States has “a history of xenophobia, 
ethnocentrism, and racism.”80 As the harms of Hate Speech become 
recognized perhaps changes in the United States will come, it is not 
foreseeable in the near future that the United States will change its 
stance on hate speech. 
 
3.3 Hate Groups 
 
As the United States has a lack of any legislation to prevent hate 
groups, many such groups exist. A famous example of such groups 
effecting society is the Skokie march (mentioned in Chapter Two), 
where a group of neo-Nazis marched through the predominantly Jewish 
neighborhood of Skokie Illinois. In 2000, The Southern Poverty Law 
Centre identified 602 hate groups operating in the US.81 All of these 
groups can publicly spread their ideas which, as stated before, can be 
very influential and counter speech can be useless due to ’confirmation 
bias’.  Groups in other countries need to cloak their hate speech in a 
specific terminology in order to circumvent legislation. For example, hate 
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 groups need to redefine themselves as anti-immigration or portray 
themselves as fighting for white equality as opposed to superiority. Yet, 
none of this is necessary in the United States. 
 
3.4 Canada 
 
Canada’s laws on hate speech are robust. As Canada was created on a 
foundation of multiculturalism it has attempted to protect its more 
vulnerable citizens. As I will show Canada’s legislation has some good 
points. It has been backed up in the courts and has the support of 
Canadians. I will also point out some flaws in the legislation that New 
Zealand should avoid. 
 
Canada established the Canadian Charter of Rights in Freedoms in 
1982; the Charter is part of the constitution of Canada. This piece of 
legislation is entrenched and acts as a Bill of Rights protecting political 
and civil rights. One aim of the charter is to unify the Canadian people. 
Section 2 of the charter guarantees ‘Fundamental Freedoms’ which 
state, “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of 
conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of 
association. The inclusion of these rights shows that Canada values 
individual rights.  
 
The Canadian charter is different from the United States model of rights 
because it contains limitations within the document. Section one set 
forward the reasonable limits clause or limitation clause. Section one is 
what allows Canada to limit hate speech while still maintaining freedom 
of expression as an important right. Section one states, “The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set 
 out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by laws as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” This 
limitation has been implemented because Canada has seen that the 
fundamental rights are not absolute, there is room around the fringe 
where those fundamental rights are often curtailed. 
 
Canada has legislated against hate speech in its criminal code. Sections 
318 and 319 entitled ‘Hate Propaganda’ create an offense for 
advocating genocide 318, public incitement of hatred 319(1), and willful 
promotion of hatred 319(2). Section 318(1) “Every one who advocates 
or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offense and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.” Section 319(1) 
“Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, 
incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is 
likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of,  
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years; or,  
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.  
Section two of 319 states “(2) Every one who, by communicating 
statements, other than in private conversation, willfully promotes hatred 
against any identifiable group is guilty of,  
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years; or,  
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.”  
 
In both sections an ‘identifiable group is “any section of the public 
distinguished by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual 
orientation.”  
  
In 2004 bill c-250 was passed by the Canadian government which 
added sexual orientation to the list of identifiable groups.  
 
An important aspect of the Canadian legislation is the inclusion of 
defenses for section 319(2). Section 319(1) refers to statements that 
would lead to direct violence or public disturbance. The equivalent of 
this under United States legislation would be fighting words. The speech 
covered under 319(1) is generally accepted to be harmful speech, as it 
leads to physical harm to property or person. Section 319(2) however, is 
the speech that does not cause violence immediately; it is speech that 
promotes hatred, and is the type of speech that this thesis is concerned 
with. The existence of defenses for such speech demonstrates that the 
legislation is intended to be narrow, to avoid a chilling effect on regular 
speech.  
 
There are four defenses to willful promotion of hatred; truth, faith, public 
interest, and a defense for the press. They are as follows, 319(3) No 
person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2),  
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;  
(b) if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by 
an argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on 
a belief in a religious text;  
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, 
the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on 
reasonable grounds he believed them to be true; or  
 (d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of 
removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred 
toward an identifiable group in Canada.    
 
Just like with defamation or libel, an absolute defense is truth. The 
second defense allows religious people freedom of religion. However, it 
must be in good faith. This means that Christians for example can 
express their dissatisfaction with a queer lifestyle, but that expression 
must be in good faith. Due to some recent developments in Canada this 
defense could be made more specific, but that shall be discussed 
separately. The third defense could be used to prevent government 
suppression of speech through these sections of the legislation. It also 
allows people some room for error; if an opinion is reasonably believed 
to be true it is defensible. The fourth defense allows the media or other 
people to repeat or say what would otherwise be considered hate 
speech for the purpose of removing such speech. For example, a news 
story could cover a racist group and publish what the group believes or 
disseminates for the intention of demonstrating how ridiculous it is, or a 
comedian could use such speech in order to satirise a hate group like 
the KKK. 
 
Subsequent sections of the legislation allow the government to seize 
any property related to the offense. Also both sections 318 and 319(2) 
require the attorney generals consent to prosecute presumably to 
prevent frivolous cases. 
 
3.5 The Oakes Test 
 
 The Oakes test is how courts decide if a violation of a fundamental right 
is justified. The test was written by Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Oakes. 
The test is used when the claimant has proven that a fundamental right 
has been violated and it is up to the crown to prove that the violation of 
the right is in the best interests of society. Briefly the test is as follows. 
1. There must be a pressing and substantial objective 
2. The means must be proportional  
1. The means must be rationally connected to the objective 
2. There must be minimal impairment of rights 
3. There must be proportionality between the infringement 
and objective 
If legislation fails one of the branches of the test it is unconstitutional.  
The Oakes test has been applied to some hate speech cases. In R. v. 
Keegstra the test was applied. James Keegstra was a high school 
teacher who taught his students that Jews had evil qualities describing 
them as “treacherous”, “subversive”, “sadistic”, “money-loving”, “power 
hungry”, and “child killers”.82 He also taught that Jews are trying to 
destroy Christianity and they made up the Holocaust to gain 
sympathy.83 He expected his students to answer tests and write essays 
expressing these views about Jews, if they failed to follow his teachings 
they would not obtain a passing grade.84 The Crown prosecuted 
Keegstra under section 282.2(2) [now section 319(2)]. The first court 
found Keegstra guilty. On appeal the conviction was quashed on the 
basis that the section 319(2) violated section 2(b) of the Charter, the 
right to freedom of expression.  The Crown appealed to the Supreme 
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 Court and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in a divided 
decision. Justice Dickson in applying the test concluded that hate 
speech is a substantial and pressing concern, and that it causes harm. 
In making this decision Justice Dickson drew from some of the 
arguments for harm, in that hate speech is of little value, unlikely to be 
true and that it is a detriment to democratic values as it silences people. 
Justice Dickson decided that, “there is a rational connection between 
319(2) and the objective of suppressing hate propaganda.”85 That this 
connection cannot be measured is to him unproblematic, because the 
legislation is likely to reduce harm. 319(2) was also drafted narrowly and 
this is what allows it to pass 2(2) of the Oakes test. The legislation is not 
overly broad, and so will have a limited chilling effect. Finally he 
concludes that the infringement on the defendants rights was not 
extremely serious, but “the objective of promoting equality and dignity 
was of substantial importance”86.  
The Keegstra decision was a 4-3 split. The dissenting Justices decided 
the opposite of Justice Dickson. That the harm done by hate speech 
was not serious and therefore there was no pressing and substantive 
need for the legislation. They agreed however, that the legislation was 
rationally connected. Nevertheless the dissenting Justice’s concluded 
that the legislation was too broad, and that it would create a chilling 
effect on acceptable speech.  
The Canadian experience has been on the whole very successful. The 
legislation has gained popular support, in large part due to Keegstra and 
Zundel whose speech was reprehensible. The areas that New Zealand 
should avoid will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
3.6 Australia 
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 Australia does not have a Charter or a Bill of rights, as a signatory to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Australian Citizens are 
granted those fundamental rights. Like in Canada the UDHR recognizes 
that there are limits to free speech and restrictions may be placed upon 
it. Australian legislation operates at state and federal levels; this work 
will focus on the federal legislation. The different states have different 
kinds of racial vilification legislation and to discuss them all would 
become unwieldy. An overview of several cases should provide a 
relevant context with which to compare the situation in New Zealand.  
Obviously this work will be a brief overview of the Australian situation as 
it is quite complex. This section will cover the legislation, several cases 
and demonstrate some areas that any future New Zealand legislation 
should avoid. 
The Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) (“RHA 1995”) is the modern version of 
legislation that was initiated in 1974. Australia has had a long debate 
covering much of the ground already covered in Chapter Two. The 
Australian debate concluded that: 
- Free speech is not absolute. 
- The proposed legislation’s infringement of free speech was necessary 
and justifiable; and 
- The degree of infringement was minor and posed no threat to 
Australian democracy.87  
New Zealand later mirrored much of this legislation, enacting its own 
legislation. However, Australia’s legislation has been updated and is 
used to punish hate speech. New Zealand on the other hand appears to 
have symbolic legislation.  
                                                 
87 Luke McNamara, Regulating Racism: Racial Vilification Laws in Australia (The Institute of 
Criminology: Sydney, Australia: 2002)  p. 43. 
 The section of the RHA 1995 relevant to vilification is section 18C: 
18C (1) It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private 
if:  
the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances to offend, insult, 
humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people; 
and 
the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of 
the other person or of some or all of the people in the group. 
This legislation has a low threshold by making conduct that is likely to 
offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate prohibited. Such a threshold is a 
low standard compared to the Canadian example where one must be 
proven to have willfully promoted hatred. The Australian legislation has 
many defenses, yet this does not change the fact that the legislation can 
be interpreted very broadly. The RHA punishes speech that is on the 
low end of the scale. Speech that is likely to insult a person is less 
serious than speech that encourages others to hate a certain group. 
Section 18C(2)-(3) states: 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), an act is taken not to be done in 
private if it: 
(a) causes words, sounds, images or writing to be communicated to the 
public; or 
(b) is done in a public place; or 
(c) is done in the sight or hearing of people who are in a public place. 
(3) In this section: 
‘public place’ includes any place to which the public have access as of 
right or by invitation, whether express or implied and whether or not a 
charge is made for admission to the place. 
 
 These sections show that not only have concerns about free speech 
shaped the legislation, but also concerns of privacy have had an 
influence.  Such restrictions on hate speech legislation are useful as it 
allows people to freely discuss anything without fear of any legislation. 
So a chilling effect if indeed one does occur would not occur 
everywhere, it would just impinge on public speech. 
 
There are defenses to the act which are covered in section 18D: 
 
Section 18C does not render unlawful anything said or done reasonably 
and in good faith; 
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate 
made or held for any genuine academic, artistic or scientific 
purpose or any other genuine purpose in the public interest or 
(c) in making or publishing 
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public 
interest; or 
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if 
the comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by 
the person making the comment. 
 
So artistic, academic, scientific, and issues relating to the public interest 
are exempt, so is the media reporting accurately on matters of public 
interest.  
These defenses help sidestep an issue put up by opponents of hate 
speech legislation. The issue is that by enacting hate speech legislation 
a state may actually ban literature that most people would not consider 
to be hate speech, examples of such works include, Mein Kampf, the 
Protocols of Zion, the Satanic Verses, Phillip Pullmans Dark Materials 
trilogy, The Chronicles of Narnia, Canterbury Tales, the Merchant of 
 Venice and even religious texts could become attacked for promoting 
hatred.88 So the Australian legislation neatly sidesteps any such 
problems by making sure their legislation is tight and not overly broad.  
 
The problem with these defenses is that the action which is legislated 
against is no less harmful if it is done under the protection of a defense. 
This argument was put forward by the Australian Arabic Council during 
the original debates over the bill which said “Exemptions under section 
18D present many problems, as the effects of the actions exempted are 
no less serious than the racist actions, and the grounds for exemptions 
do not mitigate the effect that the bill is ostensibly trying to address.” 
This argument has merit. The only reason to add such defenses is to 
satisfy free speech/constitutional issues.  
 
Another criticism of the defenses is that especially the exemption of 
academics, artists and scientists mean that the elite continue to have 
unfettered free speech, while the general populace is constrained. While 
once again a valid argument such defenses help narrow the legislation 
so that it becomes constitutionally valid.  
 
Racial vilification complaints are governed by the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). The Australian legislation 
imposes civil penalties on anyone who breaks section 18C and there are 
no federal criminal sanctions in regards to racial vilification. While 
criminal sanctions were included in the draft legislation they were 
removed before the legislation was passed into law. This was because 
of free speech sensitivity. The members debating the legislation decided 
to remove the criminal aspect with Senator Charmarette arguing that, “If 
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 this legislation is passed it will create a crime of words. This will take the 
legislation across a certain threshold into the realm of thought police --- 
the most commonly voiced concern in the community and one which I 
share.”89 On the other side of the argument Senator Spindler said that:  
 
This parliament will actually be saying to the 
community that we place greater value on 
protecting the free speech of those, who, on 
racial grounds, were threatened personal 
violence, damage to property and incitement to 
hatred, rather than those who are likely to be 
the victims of those actions. I think that is rather 
regrettable.90
 
The bill was passed with the exclusion as I said of custodial 
punishments and Senator Spindler saw the bill as a “gutted ruin”91 
Spindler obviously saw the the threat of custodial sentences to be the 
‘guts’ or the core of the issue. While the threat of prison time is a good 
deterrent it is easy to see how the opposition can use the inclusion of 
prison time to connect the legislation to the illusion of a draconian 
government out to stifle the voice of the public. To see how the 
legislation has worked it is necessary to examine some cases.  
 
3.7 Cases 
 
In order to understand how the legislation works it is necessary to see 
the results of the courts. From 13 October 1995 when the racial 
vilification amendment came into force to 30 June 2001 there were 618 
complaints under section 18C. The main reasons for complaint have 
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 been the media and neighborhood disputes making up 52% of the 
complaints.92 A large number of the complaints were declined annually 
30% and many complainants dropped their complaints quickly 26%. 
There is an emphasis on conciliation in the Australian legislation with 
23% proceeding to conciliation. A relatively low number 14.5% have 
proceeded through to trial or public inquiry or hearing. The importance 
the legislation has on resolution as opposed to resorting to litigation is a 
good sign. Of the 618 complaints only 18 were subject to a final HREOC 
public inquiry determination and a further seven cases were referred to 
the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Magistrates Court.  
 
 
The Australian legislation could do with a truth defense and perhaps 
some requirement that a complaint first be approved by a governing 
body such the Attorney General to prevent frivolous complaints. 
Although the large number of rejected complaints because they do not 
fall within the scope of the act does seem to be working to some degree 
however a number of frivolous complaints that do fall within the broad 
structure of section 18C have no way of being rejected. An example is 
Shron v Telstra where a complainant claimed that phone cards issued 
by Telstra vilified Jews. The phone card showed a World War II German 
Fighter plane that had a Nazi Swastika on its tail. It was obvious from 
the outset that this complaint would not succeed for even if it was 
decided that the picture did constitute the vilification of Jews, which I 
doubt. The image would be excluded from prosecution under section 
18D that it was in good faith.  
 
Of the cases were the courts ruled that racial vilification had occurred 
the punishments were either monetary or the courts ordered apologies 
be published and presented to the complainant. Unlike the Canadian 
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 system there is no prison time for racial vilification in Australia, however 
some hefty sums of money have been paid to complainants. The largest 
amount was $55,000, however the complaint was part racial vilification 
and part racial discrimination. The complainant was of French National 
Origin and Ugandan ancestry was subjected to racial abuse at work 
being called a “fucking black cunt”, “a fucking black lazy bastard” and 
was subjected to “monkey” gestures.93  
 
The second largest sum awarded was for $50,000 for just racial 
vilification and involved a radio station and its callers vilifying the 
Nyungar people and the Waugyl a cultural and spiritual figure for 
Nyunger communities.  The HREOC found in favour of the 
complainants.94
 
The third highest was $12,500 in connection with a sexual harassment 
and discrimination complaint95, then the decisions drop down to $1500, 
and $1000 and then to apologies. Of the 618 complaints nine were 
upheld in court and damages or apologies awarded. So this either 
means that there are a lot of frivolous complaints or that some racial 
vilification is going unpunished. Many complainants may be happy that 
their complaints were heard and accepted,96 many would have been 
settled at conciliation, and the low number of court cases show that 
freedom of expression is not being trampled. 
 
 3.8 Free Speech Versus Hate Speech Law  
 
The legality of racial vilification law has been sidestepped a little by the 
Australian courts. In Jones and Executive Council of Australian Jewry v 
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 Toben Commissioner McEvoy sidestepped the issue by stating that the 
Commision had no judicial powers and therefore no authority to asses 
the validity of commonwealth legislation, stating “It is appropriate that I 
assume the constitutional validity of the legislation which I am required 
to apply”97.   However the commissioner went on the state that in light of 
the Section 18D exceptions the legislation would be consistent with the 
implied freedom (of expression) because the law was “reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to serve the legitimate ends of preventing the 
form of racial discrimination sought to be proscribed by this part.”98  So 
while failing to make a stand on the validity of the legislation the 
Commissioner made it clear that he considers the legislation to be valid. 
Australia seems to have avoided the constitutionality debates that have 
occurred in the United States and Canada. Perhaps because racial 
vilification legislation in Australia creates only civil sanctions as the 
criminal part of the legislation was removed before it was passed into 
law. 
 
The lesson to be learned from what these countries have been through 
is that hate speech legislation has not led to a horrible result. This result 
does not give a government free reign to create oppressive legislation 
however. Free speech and free speech sensitivities go a long way to 
shaping the type of legislation that will be permitted. As such New 
Zealand need to be aware that any legislation will face free speech 
challenges and any legislation drafted needs to be carefully constructed 
so that it will not unfairly infringe on free speech.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The New Zealand Situation: An Examination of New Zealand’s 
Speech Legislation. 
 
New Zealand, along with Canada and the United States, has its own Bill 
of Rights. New Zealand’s Bill of Rights is the most recent having been 
enacted in 1990. The important distinction between the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (NZBoRA), the Canadian Charter and the United 
States Bill of Rights is that New Zealand’s NZBoRA is not entrenched. 
This means that while new legislation must take into account the 
freedoms guaranteed under the NZBoRA, courts cannot strike down 
legislation that violates the NZBoRA. This distinction means that 
challenges to Vilification law need to take place in different forms than 
those in Canada and the United States. 
 
4.1 The HRA 
 
 New Zealand’s foremost Hate speech legislation is contained within the 
Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA). It is currently a criminal offence to incite 
racial disharmony. Section 131 of the HRA states: 
 
131(1)99 Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or to a 
fine not exceeding $7,000 who, with intent to excite hostility or ill-will 
against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in New 
Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of 
that group of persons,--- 
   
 (a) Publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, 
         abusive, or insulting, or broadcasts by means of radio or 
         television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; 
         or 
   (b) Uses in any public place (as defined in section 2 (1) of the 
         Summary Offences Act 1981), or within the hearing of persons in 
         any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are 
         invited or have access, words which are threatening, abusive, or 
         insulting,--- 
being matter or words likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or  
bring into contempt or ridicule, any such group of persons in New 
Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national 
origins of that group of persons. 
 
 
Prosecutions under section 131 must gain the approval of the Attorney-
General100, presumably to prevent frivolous cases. This is mirrored in 
Canadian legislature. 
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The legislation appears to take a tough stance on hate speech. Section 
131 prohibits hate speech that is published or propagated in a public 
place, or expressions that can be viewed or heard in a public place. 
Prior to the HRA New Zealand had the Race Relations Act 1971. 
Section 25 of the Race Relations Act 1971 became section 131 of the 
HRA. Section 25 was invoked once in King-Ansell v. Police. The King-
Ansell case involved pro Nazi and anti Semitic pamphlets. The 
pamphlets were distributed around Auckland by Durward Colin King-
Ansell. The flyers contained a picture of Jesus next to a picture of Hitler 
with the captions: 
 
Jesus said to the Jews: 'Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of 
your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode 
not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a 
lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.' (John 
8:44)  
 
This was followed by a quote from Mein Kampf "[b]y defending myself 
against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord". The pamphlet 
was promoting the National Socialist Party of New Zealand of which 
King-Ansell was a member and had stood in the general election in 
1978 gaining 22 votes out of a total of18,804 votes. William C. Hodge 
argued that because King-Ansell and his party were so insignificant, the 
prosecution should not have gone ahead. Instead he should have been 
charged under the Post Office Act 1959 which prohibits the placing of 
“noxious” material in letter boxes.101 However, two complaints had been 
made so the police had investigated, gained the approval of the attorney 
general, and charged King-Ansell with inciting racial disharmony. King-
                                                 
101 William C. Hodge, “Incitement to Racial Hatred in New Zealand”, International and 
Comparative law Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 4, 918-926. Oct., 1981 p. 919. 
 Ansell was convicted and sentenced to three months imprisonment. On 
appeal the charge was upheld but the sentence reduced to a $400 fine 
because there was no threat of actual violence in the pamphlet. What 
was most important about this case was that the courts decided that 
Jews belonged to an ethnic as well as religious group.102 This decision 
meant that subsequent prosecutions involving the vilification of Jewish 
people could take place under the HRA however none ever did under 
section 131.103
 
The King-Ansell case has been the only one of its kind in New Zealand. 
No other cases involving criminal vilification have been brought before 
the courts.  There are a number of possible reasons for this; The 
Attorney-General may not have approved any more prosecutions, there 
may not have been any complaints that passed the threshold to be 
accepted by the Human Rights Commission, or the police may be 
unwilling to prosecute. There are also large sections of the public that 
are unaware of this legislation.104 Successive governments have been 
less likely to allow prosecutions under the section 131 due to fear of 
being accused of stifling free speech. In a submission to the select 
committee in 2004 the Human Rights Commission believes the reason 
there have been so few prosecutions under section 131 is because the 
legislation is too “…narrowly framed in order to allow no more than what 
was strictly necessary to implement Article 4 of CERD”105 (International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) 
 
To recap, criminal section of the HRA has been used only once in 36 
years. The King-Ansell case was not an extreme case of racism. The 
more recent mailings of letters containing pork to Muslims in Wellington 
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 were on the same degree of transgression however, religion is not 
covered under the HRA. 
 
That New Zealand has only prosecuted one person under its criminal 
vilification law means that New Zealand either has exceptional race 
relations or the legislation is not being used. It should be noted that 
section 131 is not the type of legislation that should be invoked often; it 
is reserved for extreme expressions of hate.  
 
The HRA also contains a civil proceeding in section 61, Racial 
Disharmony: 
 
61(1)106 It shall be unlawful for any person--- 
    
(a) To publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, 
         abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or 
         television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; 
         or 
   (b) To use in any public place as defined in section 2 (1) of the 
         Summary Offences Act 1981, or within the hearing of persons in 
         any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are 
         invited or have access, words which are threatening, abusive, or 
         insulting; or 
   (c) To use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or 
         insulting if the person using the words knew or ought to have 
         known that the words were reasonably likely to be published in a 
         newspaper, magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means of 
         radio or television,--- 
 
                                                 
106 Human Rights Act 1993, s 61. 
 being matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into 
contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to New 
Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of 
that group of persons. 
 
 (2) It shall not be a breach of subsection (1) of this section to 
 publish in a newspaper, magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means 
of 
 radio or television a report relating to the publication or distribution 
 of matter by any person or the broadcast or use of words by any 
person, 
 if the report of the matter or words accurately conveys the intention of 
 the person who published or distributed the matter or broadcast or used 
 the words.  
 
Section 61 is the civil arm of the HRA which enables victims of hate 
speech to gain some power back by making a complaint and (hopefully) 
seeing it through to fruition.  
 
A significant difference between sections 61 and 131 is intent. The 
criminal arm section 131 clearly defines that the action must have the 
intent to excite hostility, ill-will, or bring into contempt or ridicule. The 
motivation requirement is unusual for the police who will be investigating 
the crime.107 The police are not normally focused on the intention of the 
crime; they focus on the actus reus requirements, or elements of the 
offence.108 The civil arm section 61 has no intent requirement. That 
intent is difficult to prove and the police are not used to gathering 
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 evidence on intent, is all the more reason that section 131 is not often 
invoked. 
 
A second difference between section 61 and 131 is that section 61 has 
a defense. It is not prohibited to report on a story about vilification or 
hate speech. This allows the media and other commentators to 
comment on a situation where hate speech has been used without 
becoming liable for prosecution themselves. Providing a defense for the 
media ensures freedom of the press. It is also difficult to use this 
provision as a loophole because to be exempt from prosecution one 
must be reporting on vilification not creating it themselves.  
 
It is important to understand the history of this legislation in order to 
understand why the HRA is under utilised.  New Zealand signed the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination in October 1966. 1971 was the international year to 
combat racial discrimination and so the Race Relations Act 1971 was 
rushed through parliament.109 It would appear that the legislation was 
created for the sole purpose of fulfilling an international obligation rather 
than to protect New Zealanders. It is conceivable that the government 
wanted the legislation enacted in preparation for possible racial tension. 
The legislation would be useful if racial tension ever developed and 
thankfully that has never happened  
 
4.2 The Complaints Process 
 
The Human Rights Commission has a process to follow for making a 
complaint under section 61. When a complaint is received the complaint 
is judged and the commission decides if it will take action. If so, the 
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 disputes resolution phase is instigated. To give the proper weight to free 
speech the commission has a high threshold for complaints.  
 
In order to balance the right to express 
opinions that may be unpopular or 
controversial against material that is likely to 
expose people to hatred or contempt, the 
Commission has adopted the practice of 
requiring some evidence that the material or 
comment will increase the risk of manifestation 
of hostility or contemptuous behaviour.110
 
These thresholds of evidence mean that a large proportion of complaints 
are rejected in practice and none were accepted over a two year period. 
“In 2002 the Commission received 70 complaints alleging racial 
disharmony. In 2003, there were 210. The Commission did not pursue 
any as formal complaints111. 
 
If a complaint is accepted it moves into the conciliation phase. 
Regrettably the conciliation phase is not made public and so it is 
unknown how the cases are settled if at all.  If the disputes resolution 
phase is unsatisfactory the director of human rights proceedings can 
take the complaint to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. The case may 
then be appealed to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal.112 
Due to the high threshold there have been few cases in New Zealand to 
compare internationally. 
 
4.3 Cases 
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King- Ansell, as previously mentioned, has been the only case to have 
proceeded under section 131 or what was its predecessor.  
 
Under section 61 there have been a few cases. Proceedings 
Commissioner v Archer is an important case. A Wellington radio 
announcer made a number of comments about Chinese and Japanese 
people, including that people in Tokyo were “…about this high…and not 
that bright in the first place.”113 The announcer also said: 
 
We’ve got to pick on somebody haven’t we. I’m 
allowed to pick on the Chinese. Wasn’t it the 
Chinese—the Chinese were gonna nuke us on 
our arse about, about 5 years ago weren’t they. 
Oh good, where are they now. All moved to 
Christchurch. It’s a hell of a lot easier to pull a 
bloody rickshaw in Christchurch. It’s flat like a 
billiard table. You try pulling a rickshaw in 
Wellington. I think we should throw them all out 
of the bloody country.114
 
The case was upheld as it was decided that the comments were 
reasonably offensive. The court also decided here that the test of a 
reasonable person is inappropriate because “…he or she is unlikely to 
be excited to feelings of hostility for groups who are racially different”.115
 
Proceedings Commissioner v Archer is in contrast to Neal v Sunday 
News. In Neal v Sunday News a complainant contended that anti-
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 Australian jibes breached the Race Relations Act 1971 (The 
predecessor of the HRA). The plaintiff drew attention to the two paths 
the court could take. The court could examine the effects of the 
publication “either on the average New Zealander or, alternatively, on 
that group of New Zealanders who might be less tolerant or have a 
lower threshold of sensitivity than the majority”.116 Instead of following 
either path the court focused on the likely response of the people who 
would read the newspaper. In the end the complaint was dismissed. It 
appeared that the court was searching for a way to make a subjective 
decision in an objective framework. Creating a subjective framework is 
one possible change that could be made to the system.  This possibility 
is discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Skelton v Sunday Star Times illustrates the problem with not being able 
to stop frivolous complaints if the complainant wishes to take the matter 
directly to court. “His objection was to the policy of a local newspaper to 
capitalize the names of all ethnic groups except ‘pakeha,’ which he 
thought insulted himself and this group as a whole.”117 The court 
decided that the “‘‘views of the very sensitive are not the appropriate 
yardstick by which to measure whether something is insulting.”118 This 
case illustrates that the courts could decide between legitimate 
complaints and frivolous ones. This discounts some of the fears of the 
opponents of vilification legislation that the courts will not be able to 
decide between opinion and hate speech. 
 
4.4 Summary Offences Act 1981 (SOA) 
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 Currently in New Zealand Hate Speech is prosecuted under the 
Summary Offences Act 1981 (SOA). If the offender is convicted they 
can be sentenced under the Sentencing Act 2002.119
 
While not having the same level of punishment as the HRA sections, the 
SOA is fair to all members of society. The SOA is only suitable for 
offending done in person. The following sections of the SOA are used to 
prosecute hate speech. 
 
Section 3: Disorderly Behavior likely to cause violence (punishable by 3 
months imprisonment and $2,000 fine).  
 
Section 4: of the Summary Offences Act 1981, Offensive behavior or 
language allows for the police to prosecute people for certain types of 
vilification of racist speech. It is as follows; 
 
(1) Every person is liable to a fine not exceeding [$1,000] who,-- 
(a) In or within view of any public place, behaves in an offensive or 
disorderly manner; or 
(b) In any public place, addresses any words to any person intending 
to threaten, alarm, insult, or offend that person; or 
(c) In or within hearing of a public place,-- 
(i) Uses any threatening or insulting words and is reckless 
whether any person is alarmed or insulted by those 
words; or 
(ii) Addresses any indecent or obscene words to any 
person. 
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 (2) Every person is liable to a fine not exceeding [$500] who, in or 
within hearing of any public place, uses any indecent or obscene 
words. 
 
(3) In determining for the purposes of a prosecution under this 
section whether any words were indecent or obscene, the court 
shall have regard to all the circumstances pertaining at the 
material time, including whether the defendant had reasonable 
grounds for believing that the person to whom the words were 
addressed, or any person by whom they might be overheard, 
would not be offended. 
 
(4) It is a defense in a prosecution under subsection (2) of this 
section if the defendant proves that he had reasonable grounds 
for believing that his words would not be overheard. 
 
(5) Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to any publication 
within the meaning of the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classifications Act 1993, whether the publication is objectionable 
within the meaning of that Act or not. 
 
Section 21: Intimidation or speaking threateningly (punishable by 3 
months imprisonment and a $2,000 fine). 
 
Section 37: Disturbing Public Worship (punishable by 3 months 
imprisonment and a $2,000 fine) 
 
The Summary Offences are under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand 
Police and as such, the complaints are pursued independently of the 
complainant. The HRA is complainant driven which requires them to be 
aware that a law has been broken when they are harassed or abused. In 
 contrast, the SOA offence is investigated by the police and the 
complaint is Police driven.  
 
The SOA and the HRA As only protect public expressions. This is due to 
privacy concerns and is as far as the legislation should extend. The 
SOA covers what is considered is a weakness in some hate speech 
legislation, The weakness is how to deal with people using words that 
have no derogatory impact within a specific social group. For example 
within Black American culture, some members fondly refer to each other 
as a ‘nigger’, but if someone outside that culture was to refer to them as 
a ‘nigger’, they would perceive that as an insult.  Section 4 sidesteps this 
issue via subsection (3) which explains that if the defendant “…had 
reasonable grounds for believing that the person to whom the words 
were addressed, or any person by whom they might be overheard, 
would not be offended.”120
 
This Act is also fair; it covers everyone regardless of ethnicity, gender, 
or religion. If someone feels offended or insulted by what is said to them, 
they can make a complaint to the police.  
 
4.5 Sentencing Act 2002 
 
When the SOA and the Sentencing Act are combined we can see how 
effective this combination can be in prosecuting vilification in some 
instances. The Sentencing Act allows the court to take into account 
aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing offenders.  
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 9(1) In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court must 
take into account the following aggravating factors to the extent that they 
are applicable in the case121: 
 
(h) that the offender committed the offence partly or wholly because of 
hostility towards a group of persons who have an enduring characteristic 
such as race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, age, or disability; and  
 
(i) the hostility is because of the common characteristic; and 
(ii) the offender believed that the victim has that characteristic.122 
 
This combination means that while the HRA criminal offence is never 
used, hate speech can be prosecuted. As the conviction relies on other 
matters than just the hate speech action it is difficult to use the New 
Zealand cases in direct comparison to international cases. Cases using 
the SOA and just involving speech are few.  
 
An example of the SOA in practice: a man verbally abused a Muslim 
woman wearing a burqa. The woman was called a terrorist and told that 
she should leave the country. The woman’s husband was also told to 
send his wife back home. The incident occurred on street busy with 
pedestrians. The man was convicted of disorderly behavior and 
sentenced to 120 hours community service.123  
 
The sentencing Act is also combined with other criminal codes to create 
a hate crime conviction. As the Sentencing Act contains many protected 
groups its scope is far wider than the current HRA Hate Speech 
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 legislation. The Sentencing Act is used for all crimes and the 
aggravating factor sub section (h) is most commonly invoked when 
convicting someone of violence based on a person’s race or other 
protected category. So the way that hate crime is punished in New 
Zealand is to gain a conviction from the SOA, the crimes act 1961 or 
even the Harassment Act 1997. Then the hate crime section of the 
sentencing act is invoked to gain a harsher penalty against those who 
target their victims because of the group they belong to or are perceived 
to belong to.  
 
4.6 Harassment Act 1997 
 
The Harassment Act 1997 was used in Wellington to convict a man who 
sent abusive letters containing pork to Muslims.124 The incident gained 
widespread publicity, being broadcast on the major television news 
shows, and also making it into the international media with the Taipei 
Times reporting on the story125. The offender was convicted of criminal 
harassment under section 8 of the Harassment Act 1997.126 The police 
in prosecuting showed strong support towards punishing this type of 
crime. Detective Inspector Quinn said. "We hope the outcome of this 
investigation is that people will see that intolerant behaviour is 
unacceptable; that they will become more tolerant and respectful of the 
diversity of ethnic and faith based groups and welcome their contribution 
to our communities."127 The defendant was a Christian and claimed that 
he was attempting to attack the victim’s religion not them personally. 
This could have been a valid defense had a charge been brought under 
the HRA as religion is not a protected category in New Zealand. The 
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 simplicity of combining the Sentencing Act with other legislation is that 
convictions can be readily gained against people without the need for 
lengthy drawn out rights based court battles such as have occurred in 
the USA, Canada and Australia.  The defendant was subsequently 
convicted and punished with six months imprisonment and reparations 
of $500 to each victim.128 The defendant was also charged with one 
count of unlawful possession of a pistol129 which makes it difficult to 
make comparisons to punishments for similar crimes internationally.  
 
The New Zealand situation is rather unique, as the hate speech 
legislation as contained in the HRA, was created to meet international 
guidelines and has been rarely used. Instead, the existing law has 
changed to restrict direct ‘fighting words’ through the Sentencing Act 
2002. So New Zealand is restricting hate speech while many New 
Zealanders do not even know that hate speech legislation exists.130 This 
is an unsatisfactory situation. If hate speech is bad for society and New 
Zealand has decided that it is, then it should be punished in all its forms, 
not just through other legislation.  
 
Different media is governed by different legislation. The way hate 
messages are conveyed affects if it is covered by the HRA. Expressions 
of hate that are covered under the HRA include “messages written, or 
broadcast by means of radio or television, or spoken in public.”131 
Methods of distributing messages that are not covered include 
telephone, fax, and computer networks. The HRA does not cover media 
that is not broadcast. Examples of media that is not broadcast include 
music, film, video, art, and photographs.132 Although certain symbols 
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 are covered, displaying the swastika for example could open up the 
responsible person to prosecution under both sections 61 and 131 of the 
HRA.133
 
4.7 Media 
 
Because of the limited scope of the HRA, in relation to media, as 
technology improves and more information is passed over the internet, 
hate speech may escape the examination of the HRA. This would create 
a double standard as hate messages propagated on the internet would 
be untouchable by hate speech legislation. The internet is already the 
communication tool of choice for New Zealand’s racist groups. Racist 
groups internationally can escape their own countries vilification 
legislation by hosting their websites in the United States. A recent New 
Zealand example of a racist website was ‘RedWatch NZ”, run by Nic 
Miller. This site posted pictures of anti-racist activists along with their 
personal information including phone numbers and private addresses. 
Miller came to the attention of media when he also posted the pictures 
and personal information of four Jewish families, including the 
information of Professor Peter Muntz, 85, a German born holocaust 
survivor. Miller was also reported in the press as saying "I do not like the 
Jews, not one bit. They should have been exterminated … Jews being 
in New Zealand is harassment to me. They do not belong here."134 The 
Sunday News reported that Miller was under investigation by the New 
Zealand police135 but nothing has been heard since. The internet will be 
the future haven for racists unless something can be done about it.  
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 Films are another problem area for the HRA legislation. The Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA) is legislation 
setting out how the Office of Film and Literature Classification may 
censor items. Section 3(3)(e) of the FVPCA requires the censor, when 
taking into consideration if a publication is objectionable, to give 
credence to the extent to which the publication characterizes that a 
group of persons as inherently inferior by reason of one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination in section 21(1) of the HRA. 
 
Section 3(3)(e) – [A publication shall be 
objectionable if it-] Represents (whether directly 
or by implication) that members of any particular 
class of the public are inherently inferior to other 
members of the public by reason of any 
characteristic of members of that class, being a 
characteristic that is a prohibited ground of 
discrimination specified in section 21(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1993.136
 
The prohibited grounds as described in the HRA are sex, marital status, 
religious belief, ethical belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, 
disability, illness, age, political opinion, employment status, family 
status, or sexual orientation.137 The legislation appeared solid until 2000 
when the Living World138  case defined how the act would work. The 
Living World case revolved around two videos which were censored by 
the Office of Film and Literature Classification because they were 
believed to have vilified homosexuals, or in the context of the FVPCA, 
the videos represented homosexuals as inherently inferior to other 
                                                 
136 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 s3(3)(e). 
137 Human Rights Act 1993 s21(1). 
138 Living World Distributors v Human Rights Action Group (Living Word) [2000] 3 NZLR 
570, 582 (CA) Richardson P for the majority. See also Ursula Cheer ‘More Censorship, 
Discrimination and Bill of Rights” (December 2000) New Zealand Law Journal 472. 
 members of the public.139 The distributors of the videos in New Zealand 
appealed the censor’s decision. On appeal the videos were deemed to 
not be objectionable because of the definition of objectionable under the 
act.140 The definition of objectionable under the FVPCA section 3(1) is”  
 
For the purposes of this Act, a publication is 
objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, 
or otherwise deals with matters such as sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a 
manner that the availability of the publication is 
likely to be injurious to the public good.141
 
The court said that this definition sets up five gateways; sex, horror, 
crime, cruelty and violence.142 If the protected group is represented as 
inferior within one of the five gateways then the publication may be 
deemed objectionable. In the Living World tapes there was no sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty or violence, and therefore even though the tapes 
vilify homosexuals they cannot be made objectionable. The appeal court 
ruling makes section 3(3)(e) redundant unless it is accompanied by one 
of the five gateways. The court viewed freedom of expression highly 
stating “[T]he ultimate inquiry under s 3 involves balancing the rights of a 
speaker and of the members of public to receive information under s 14 
of the Bill of Rights as against the state interest under the 1993 Act in 
protecting individuals from harm caused by the speech”.143
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 The Office of Film and Literature Classification wanted the power to 
censor a video because of the message it portrayed, not the actions, 
just the message. In New Zealand the courts have decided that it is ok 
for a video to vilify homosexuals144, but that same vilification cannot be 
done in a face to face encounter145. This seems cogent enough.  A face 
to face encounter is unavoidable in most circumstances as people do 
not typically go out in public with the intention of being harassed and 
insulted. Conversely, one must actively seek out these videos to see the 
message and remain watching in order to see the full impact. The issue 
is not that these films would be offensive to queer people, the issue is 
that these films entrench a false preconceived notion. This notion that 
homosexuals are inferior and immoral is strongly held in some religious 
circles, these groups believe that God sent AIDS to punish the 
homosexuals.146 These films perpetuate homophobia and that cannot 
be good for our society. Therefore it must be injurious to the public 
good. Another clash of rights occurs here.  Through ‘Freedom of 
Religion’ people are free to believe in what they like, unfortunately some 
people believe that being heterosexual is the only way to live your life. If 
these films were racist in nature there would have been less debate. 
The interpretation of the legislation currently seems to promote a 
loophole for racist material. The HRA needs to be empowered to cover 
media that is not broadcast, such as films and videos, or the censor’s 
office needs to be given the power to restrict hate speech when it occurs 
under its jurisdiction. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 Putting the Options on the Table: An Analysis of the Possible 
Policy Options. 
 
5.1 Problems With the Current Situation 
 
The New Zealand system has many different ways of dealing with hate 
speech. The HRA provisions are somewhat complex and less likely to 
be used by those really in need. In fact the Human Rights Commissioner 
has said that the largest numbers of complaints under section 61 are 
made by Pakeha males who complain about Maori.147 Perhaps it is not 
the legislation that is letting us down, but the structure surrounding that 
system. Or, as West-Newman says, “[I]t might reasonably be assumed 
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 that the practical problems of framing truly effective legislation and an 
institutional infrastructure for hearing complaints and providing remedies 
have not yet been solved”. It is hard to tell without an in depth study. 
West-Newman sums up what could easily be changed within the New 
Zealand system. The process needs to be simplified for those most in 
need, taking the burden off their hands and allowing them to see the 
system working for them, instead of against them. Most minorities 
already feel that everyone is against them, the last thing they need is to 
feel that they have no recourse through the HRA, because it is either too 
complex, or to unwieldy for them to use. We should not however go to 
the extreme of creating legislation that only works for minorities. The law 
needs to protect all of its citizens. Racism is more harmful when 
perpetrated by a dominant group, but it is no less reprehensible for a 
minority group to practice racism or other bigotry against a majority 
group.  
 
The system surrounding the HRA does not let spectators see the results 
of conciliation or of the Human Rights Review Tribunal. What would be 
enlightening to observe, would be the cases reported, and which cases 
were accepted and rejected. Obviously a large amount of the complaints 
rejected would fall outside the scope of the HRA as it is limited to race, 
ethnicity, national origin and colour.  
 
Presently people from the groups mentioned in the Sentencing Act have 
some protection from hate speech through tougher sentencing of direct 
criminal confrontations. However, incitement to hatred is not being 
enforced. There have been few instances of this occurring, the most 
recent being the website ‘redwatch’ published by Nicholas Miller and his 
public comments regarding Jews. The police stated that they were 
 investigating, although no prosecution or result has yet been 
announced.148  
 
There are still people who disagree with vilification law. Such people see 
more speech as the only answer. A significant publication which is 
referenced by many on this matter is a book by Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth, called ‘Rights and Freedoms’. In the book they attack New 
Zealand’s legislation, in that it impinges on expression too much. “My 
argument here is a simple one: sections 61 and 131 cannot be justified 
as reasonable limitations on freedom of expression because they are 
overbroad in their application. They allow no exceptions, and thus limit 
expression far more than can be justified.”149 Other authors have 
attacked Huscroft and Rishworth’s book it is a rehash of the arguments 
for free speech in Chapter Two.150 A view that the legislation is 
unnecessary is prominent amongst the public who believe they should 
have unfettered free speech. This view is an impediment to anyone 
attempting to alter the legislation. If a government attempts to add to the 
legislation the opposing parties merely have to cry ‘free speech’ and a 
large proportion of the population will feel their rights are being eroded 
and that they are on a slippery slope, even though New Zealand has 
had vilification legislation for 36 years. These attitudes were plain to see 
in the submissions to the select committee.151
 
The law also sees groups other than race as vulnerable and needing 
protection. This can be seen by their inclusion in the Sentencing Act. 
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 Yet, the HRA still only protects incitement to racial disharmony.152 
Religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, or disability are all 
absent from the hate speech legislation within the HRA. The HRA 
provides all the different groups protection from discrimination, but not 
from hate speech. There is no good reason why. A less than satisfactory 
answer is because there have been no international charters for New 
Zealand to sign that would protect people from other categories from 
vilification. 
 
Presently within New Zealand the impact of vilification legislation cannot 
be quantified. There are no systems in place to track hate crimes. The 
statistics that could support either side of the argument for and against 
hate speech laws are unavailable. This is a real problem in deciding if 
there is a pressing and substantial need for legislation.  
 
 
5.2 Policy Options 
 
5.3 Do Nothing 
 
The simplest option is to leave the legislation alone. A government is 
going to have a hard time passing any new legislation on this issue 
unless there is a policy failure, such as a public event demonstrating 
how harmful hate speech can be. The reason it would be so hard to 
pass any legislation is because it is an issue with emotive words that 
any opposition can press. For example the opposition would just have to 
claim that ‘free speech’ is under attack and they would gain a large 
number of supporters who do not fully understand the issue. Also the 
legislation is working to some degree153 although it is hard to measure 
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 its successes or failures as there are no mechanisms that track such 
events.  
 
5.4 Monitor the Situation 
 
Currently in New Zealand there is no system set up to assess the 
prevalence of hate crimes or hate speech. The European Union has 
established a centre to monitor racism and xenophobia. This allows 
them to gain data to track any impacts legislation may have. The United 
States has the Hate Crime Statistics Act 1990. This Act requires the 
justice department to collect statistics about hate crimes.154 While 
establishing a whole centre to track hate crime data in New Zealand 
would be unfeasible, the preferred option would be to provide the 
Human Rights Commission a directive to track incidents of hate crimes, 
and hate speech. This would allow the effectiveness of legislation to be 
seen. Without an overview of the situation it is difficult to see if Sir Isaiah 
Berlin’s ‘absolute loss of liberty’155 is occurring.  
 
5.5 Alter the Current Human Rights Act Legislation 
 
There are a number of ways the HRA could be altered. Sections 61 and 
131 could be repealed and New Zealand would then rely on other 
statutes such as the Crimes Act and the Sentencing Act to punish hate 
speech/crimes. This option comes about because neither section 61 nor 
131 are used today. This is not preferred because even though New 
Zealand has comparatively good race relations, “New Zealand is not 
immune from global patterns of migration, religious intolerance and 
xenophobia, or from border defying high and low technologies and 
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 market driven media.”156 The legislation is there to protect New 
Zealanders’ from a potential collapse in race relations.  
 
Lowering the threshold of sections 61 and 131 is also an option. This 
would prosecute more people. Lowering the threshold would also mean 
that many frivolous complaints would find their way through the system. 
The Human Rights Commissions stance of requiring some evidence of 
harm is the right approach.157 This approach respects the value of free 
speech while not trivializing genuine grievances. The high threshold of 
section 61 and 131 should be maintained. Such legislation is not 
designed to be used often; instead it should be reserved for extreme 
speech, in this way the HRA would cover extreme speech and lower 
level offending would be covered under other legislation. This would 
minimize any impacts on free expression.  
 
Subjectivity should play a role in the courts decisions about vilification. 
Currently in New Zealand when the Human Rights Commission receives 
a complaint, it must first decide whether the material complained of is 
threatening, abusive or insulting. To do this, the Commission employs 
an objective “reasonable person” test158. The Commission then decides 
if offense is all that has taken place or if the offending material is also 
likely to “excite hostility” against a particular group or “bring them into 
contempt” on the identified grounds.159 If what was said or published 
was simply offensive the complaint is not pursued. If what was said or 
published was likely to “excite hostility” the complaint will then be 
investigated.  
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 The courts could use a two stage framework for assessing complaints, 
this framework has been created in Canada, and it is as follows:   
 
Stage one - “A communication or comment, viewed objectively, must be 
hateful or contemptuous and, assessed in its context, likely to have the 
effect of making it more acceptable for others to manifest hatred or 
contempt against the person or group concerned.”160  
 
But when viewing the comments the court must keep the comments in 
context. Therefore a second stage is required. The Canadian judiciary 
made it clear that the framework is not a “rigid test to be applied 
mechanistically but rather as an analytical framework for assessing 
content and effect of material.”161 And stage two would take into account 
that: 
 
…context is critical in understanding the 
meaning of a message. The meaning conveyed 
by an expression may vary depending on its 
context. An expression that appears neutral or 
innocuous out of context may take on a very 
different meaning when put in its proper context. 
Context for this purpose includes not only the 
publication context but also the social and 
historical context. The “reasonable person” is 
not a purely abstract entity. The person is 
someone of this place and this time, with 
knowledge of the past and present. The 
reasonable person brings with him or her a set 
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 of social and personal characteristics (albeit 
characteristics that are unknown). What a 
reasonable person will understand will depend 
on the extent to which they are informed of the 
context of the message. Accordingly, the 
context must be a consideration of this part of 
the test.162
 
This variation of the reasonable man would allow courts to properly 
place complaints in context and evaluate the harm caused by speech 
appropriately. This context explains why for example holocaust denial is 
so harmful to Jews and others affected by the holocaust, yet similar 
citizens may not find it disturbing at all.  
 
New Zealand judges understand that subjectivity is important when 
dealing with hate speech. Zdrahal v Wellington City Council was a case 
where Mr. Zdrahal painted two Swastikas’ on his house. Mr. Zdrahal 
was then given an abatement notice under the Resource Management 
Act. On appeal Mr. Zdrahal claimed his freedom of expression had been 
infringed.163 Justice Greig J said when dismissing the appeal: 
 
In a sense the decision in matters such as this 
is and must be subjective because it is what is 
perceived by the ears or the eyes and its effect 
on the individual and his personal wellbeing. 
Offensiveness or objectionability cannot be 
measured by a machine or by some standard 
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 with arithmetical gradations. It is a matter of 
perception in the mind.164
 
Such a two stage framework for analyzing complaints would mean that 
the many frivolous complaints the Commission deals with could be 
avoided and low level complaints would also not get through as they 
would have to pass an objective test, and then a subjective test. When 
a complaint makes it to court the Justices would have a clear directive 
that the ‘reasonable man’ test needs to be subjective.  
 
The scope of sections 61 and 131 could be increased in a number of 
ways. More groups could be added under the protection of the law. New 
Zealand could follow other countries in giving protection to religion and 
homosexuals. It could even go to the scope of Canada and provide 
protection for everyone ascribed protection from discrimination. Another 
option is to give the protection of section 131 to everyone. It could be 
amended to “…an offence of “inciting serious vilification” in the 
appropriate criminal legislation ensuring vilification directed at an 
individual, or individuals, motivated by their membership of a particular 
group is subject to criminal sanction.”165 This is the recommendation of 
the Human Rights Commission stating that protection from serious 
vilification may need to be proscribed to groups that have not been 
thought of yet.166 However, with such broad language may protect 
groups that would not have been thought of. Perhaps a person could be 
vilified for being a rapist, and because he belongs to a specific group 
(rapists), the person vilifying an evil action and group of people would 
be punished. The range of protection that section 131 can offer should 
be as broad as possible, without providing protection to groups who 
should not be provided protection for example pedophiles. It could be 
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 seen that without defining what groups are allowed protection, and 
merely ascribing protections to any group, then pedophiles, rapists, 
murderers would be exempt from vilification. It should be permissible to 
criticize criminal groups using strong language. The most beneficial 
range may be all of the groups protected by the HRA from 
discrimination. This would provide broad coverage, and because the 
threshold is high, section 131 would not prevent, for example, debates 
amongst religious groups. This would be proactive legislation in terms 
that any likely offences that it would prosecute have not yet happened in 
New Zealand and hopefully with such legislation they will not happen in 
New Zealand. Cases like Keegstra, in Canada, need tough legislation in 
order to prevent such activity.  
 
Section 61 could be amended to include all the protected categories, 
while maintaining a high threshold in order to prevent any serious 
infringements on free expression. Ascribing protection to all groups in 
section 61 would mean a massive influx of inadequate complaints.  
 
The scope of the HRA should also be amended to include all 
communications, regardless of media. While new technology such as 
the internet may hold new challenges for vilification legislation, it is 
important that the scope of the legislation extend into cyberspace. The 
internet is the new home of racist and bigoted groups and New Zealand 
needs to ensure that it has the proper legislative structures in place to 
prevent the spread of extremely harmful ideas such as Nicholas Millers 
Website that advocates removing Jews form New Zealand. This would 
create a double up of legislation as other Acts govern other media, 
however as the HRA has a high threshold it is appropriate that it acts as 
a governing body over the other gatekeepers of media.  
 
 Defenses could also be added to the legislation. At present section 61 
of the HRA has a defense that covers the media and others reporting on 
hate speech. New Zealand could follow Canada which has four 
defenses, truth, faith, public interest, and a defense for the press. 
Australia on the other hand has artistic, academic, scientific, public 
interest, and media exemptions. All of these defenses except truth and 
the media create loopholes. These defenses are couched in a good 
faith clause, which means that if hate speech is used it must be in good 
faith. Each defense has its drawbacks and as was argued in Australia if 
an academic or an artist is using hate speech it is no less offensive than 
a layperson using hate speech. It is possible to add defenses to the 
HRA, however section 131 needs no defenses as it has an intent clause 
and it is unlikely that anything said in an artistic or academic work is 
going to intentionally vilify a group. If one of the defended categories is 
intentionally vilifying a group, it should not be granted an exemption 
anyway. Due to the high thresholds already in place and no previous 
record of prosecutions that could have been protected by a defense, 
there does not appear to be any reason to provide any more defenses. 
 
Other legislation could be amended to provide protection from hate 
speech. This option was recommended by the select committee 
examining the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act. The 
committee recommended giving more power to the chief censor by 
removing the gateways. Removal of the gateways would allow the 
censor to decide if material constituted hate speech.167 The censor 
would have to ascertain if the material was injurious to the public good 
to censor any material.168 If an amendment is made to the Films, Videos 
and Publications Classification Act 1993 vilification issues should be 
differed by the Human Rights Commission. Or, if the censor wishes to 
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 rate the material as objectionable the author or distributor of the 
material should have recourse to appeal to the Human Rights 
Commission in order to determine if the material is in fact injurious to 
the public good. This deferral would be implemented because the 
Human Rights Commission is most often dealing with such issues, 
therefore they would be best equipped to deal with matters of free 
expression. For example if the other governing bodies wish to defer 
matters of serious vilification that does not come under their control they 
should be able to defer such cases to the Human Rights Commission. 
Under the HRA both sides can properly argue through the courts.  
 
5.6 The problem of Religion 
 
The discussion over religion as a protected category has been debated 
in previous theses169. Joel Harrison argued that religion should not be a 
protected category as religious groups all use rhetoric against other 
religions frequently. Rhetoric and discussing other religions in a less 
than favorable light have long been part of religious debates. The 
reason this should not concern lawmakers is because society has not 
come to a consensus about what religion, if any, is true and we should 
therefore leave religion alone in terms of legislation. Harrison cites the 
Catch the Fire Ministries case in Australia as evidence that creating a 
punishment for vilifying religions will only make religious groups attempt 
to assert their religion and superiority over other religions through the 
courts. The Catch the Fire Ministries v Islamic Council of Australia is 
one example of this.170
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 A brief overview will be provided as the case was not examined earlier, 
because the case falls under state legislation. The case was brought 
under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Victoria). The case 
involved three publications, a website, a newsletter and a seminar. The 
Islamic Council sent some of its members to a seminar conducted by 
two Christian preachers. The seminar did not present a balanced view 
of Islam and so the Islamic Council made a complaint that they had 
been vilified by the two preachers. Eventually the case was dismissed in 
the Court of Appeal.171
 
There is another example in Canada R v Harding. Mr. Harding 
published two pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.172 In his 
publications Mr. Harding denounced Islam as a wicked religion stating 
that Muslims “…sound peaceful and try to act peaceful, but underneath 
their false sheep’s clothing, are raging wolves”.173 Mr. Harding was 
misguided and no doubt his pamphlets are offensive to some readers. 
However, it does not reach the same level as other forms of vilification. 
Mr. Harding’s response to this was to call for a rejection of Muslim 
immigrants and to have more Christianity in schools. While Mr. 
Harding’s views are disagreeable, they would not constitute extreme 
vilification. 
 
The problem with this legislation is that religious groups are bound to 
use speech that puts down other religions. Religious groups wish to 
gain the most followers of their particular religion; no one agrees on 
what religion is correct so heated debate will ensue. These debates 
should be left alone as debates. New Zealand would be covered from 
serious vilification against religion if section 131 was amended; however 
any other limitations on religious speech should be avoided. One 
                                                 
171 Harrison, p. 3. 
172 R v Harding 160 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 229 (2002). 
173 Ibid. 
 particular problem when discussing religion is that an author may attack 
a religion, and its followers will perceive that as an attack on them and 
thus lay vilification charges. However, the author has a genuine belief 
that if these people hear how horrible their religion is and how great the 
author’s religion is, then they will change faiths. When viewing the other 
categories for example race or sexuality, an attack on the category 
cannot be separated from an attack on the person. Religion is after all a 
voluntary association, a highly held association but voluntary.  
 
That is not to say that people are not vilified are verbally assaulted 
because of their religion. New Zealand however, has demonstrated that 
it is willing to protect its more vulnerable citizen’s religious ideals. In 
recent years there have been many attacks on Muslims. Even without 
protection from the HRA the offenders have been caught in most 
instances and prosecuted under other legislation.174  
The courts in Tariq v Young175  and Khan v Commissioner176, 
Department of Corrections Services have decided that Muslims do not 
comprise an ethnic group, and therefore do not gain any protection 
currently from the HRA.  
 
Elizabeth Macpherson argues about the problem of religion from a 
different angle, contesting that religion should be free from prosecution 
under vilification legislation. Macpherson cites section 15 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 that states “[e]very person has the right 
to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and 
either in public or private.”177  
 
                                                 
174 Refer to the Harassment Act subsection in Chapter 3.  
175 Tariq v Young (Employment Appeals Tribunal 247738/88, EOR Discrimination Case Law 
Digest No2). 
176 Khan v Commissioner, Department of Corrections Services [2002] NSWADT 131. 
177 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 15. 
 An example of religious vilification and the law comes from Sweden.  
Rev. Ake Green was convicted under Sweden’s hate speech laws. 
Green, in his sermon equated homosexuality with pedophilia and 
bestiality.178 He said that “homosexuals were ‘a deep cancer tumour on 
all of society’ and that gays were more likely than other people to rape 
children and animals.”179 Green was however found not guilty on appeal 
and that ruling was held up in the Supreme Court.180 In the courts 
decision they decided that the law was not meant to impact upon 
religion and sermons.181 The court said that he had a “right to preach 
‘the Bible's categorical condemnation of homosexual relations as a sin,’ 
the court said, even if that position was ‘alien to most citizens’ and if 
Green's views could be ‘strongly questioned’”.182 This example shows 
that the courts can make decisions differentiating between what they 
see as an infringement on free speech, and what is vilification. If Greens 
comments had been in a public place the conviction would have stood, 
but because they were said in a sermon in a church the courts decided 
that it was Greens right to free speech that made is sermon acceptable 
in that setting. The same reasoning would be applied in New Zealand.  
 
Giving religion a free pass in terms of hate speech makes no sense. 
Macpherson agrees that vilification legislation should trump the right to 
free speech in specific circumstances183, yet seems unwilling to budge 
on the stance that vilification should not trump religion in certain 
circumstances.184 Racial hate speech or hate speech against queers 
should not be accepted. Governing bodies however, should be 
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 prepared to accept that religious groups may promote hate within their 
religious places as not to intrude into private life. Religious groups 
should not be given a free pass to publicly espouse hatred. Religions 
need to fit their beliefs around what is acceptable within a society at the 
present time, while being given as much freedom to practice their 
religion as possible. Unfortunately for certain religions society has 
decided that it will not accept the promotion of hatred, be it secular or 
religious.  
 
5.7 The Oakes Test for New protected groups 
 
There needs to be a substantial and pressing need in order for more 
legislation to be enacted. In respect to extending the scope of the HRA 
to cover more media and to protect extra groups there is a substantial 
and pressing need to prevent harm. Studies have exposed that gays, 
lesbians and bisexuals suffer more verbal abuse than heterosexual 
people. A survey ascertained that queer people, 77 percent of men and 
64 percent of woman had been subjected to verbal abuse at least 
once.185 “A Christchurch Health and Development study discovered that 
queer couples at age 21 were six times more likely to have attempted 
suicide than heterosexuals.186 Clearly these studies do not prove that 
hate speech had anything to do with the abuse or suicide attempts, but 
it would not be unreasonable to conclude that it was a material 
contributing factor.187 Naturally the more data the better, which is why 
the Human Rights Commission should be given the directive to gather 
statistics on hate speech, and hate crime. From the information 
available it is clear that there is a substantial and pressing need, for 
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 clearly queer people are not advantaged with the same equality as the 
dominant hegemony.  
 
In Human Rights Commission complaints, people with disabilities are 
the predominant group making complaints. In 2001 people with 
disabilities were the highest group comprising of between 30 and 50 
percent of the complaints.188 Yet again there is a lack of statistics 
relevant to hate speech for people with disabilities. It is once again safe 
to assume that if people with disabilities are making a high number of 
complaints that are being accepted in other areas, then they would also 
face hate speech issues. Raw data would allow a complete picture and 
provide a more persuasive argument to those detractors who do not see 
a pressing need for legislation.  
For the second arm of the Oakes test the means must be proportional. If 
it is accepted that the means for preventing hate speech in the context 
of race are acceptable, then the same means should be accepted for 
the other categories that would gain protection. It appears that the 
added categories would pass the Oakes test if you accept the data 
provided, and the common sense approach that if Race, Disability, 
Sexuality, and Age all need protection from discrimination, then it is a 
fair conclusion that they should be granted protection from hate speech. 
With the high threshold currently being provided by the Human Rights 
Commission, there should be a minimal infringement on freedom of 
expression.  
5.8 The Way Forward 
It has been submitted in this recommendation that the harms caused by 
hate speech are sufficient enough to warrant legislation prohibiting such 
                                                 
188 The Human Rights Commission http://www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p=13797&format=text 
(last accessed 27 February 2007) See Tirohia April 2001 - Tirohia February 2002. 
 speech. However, that legislation should be carefully drafted in order to 
protect, as much as possible, the freedoms guaranteed under the Bill of 
Rights. As it presently stands New Zealand has a healthy system of 
dealing with racism and bigotry. Open vilification is not accepted in 
many places within New Zealand and the multiple ways of dealing with 
hate speech give more options to those who have been the victims of 
direct face to face confrontational racist hate speech. They can make a 
complaint, in the first instance, to the police. If the offender is not 
prosecuted through that avenue they can also complain to the Human 
Rights Commission. If a radio or television program maligns a person 
and their race, they can complain again to the police, and secondly to 
the station or channel broadcasting.  Subsequently complainants can 
complain to the appropriate authority which is the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority. If all of that fails the victim still has recourse to 
complain to the Human Rights Commission. What this has illustrated is 
that the victims of hate speech in New Zealand have options. They have 
the ability to take some power back and have recourse through the 
appropriate channels. The problem begins when a person is vilified for 
something other than their race. Again, they have some avenues, but if 
they fail there is no ultimate recourse of action. The system could be 
made more coherent and manageable by altering a few things. For 
example why is race the only category given protection from vilification? 
The harms are equal when being vilified no matter what minority group 
one belongs to, whether it is a group based on race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexual orientation, disability, or some other minority group. For this 
reason the scope of the HRA in terms of who it protects should be 
increased.  
All means of communicating hateful messages should be subject to the 
authority of the HRA. The Human Rights Commission should be treated 
as an overarching authority. The HRA should be given the authority to 
investigate and prosecute hate speech regardless of the medium. There 
 will be difficulties with this approach, especially in regards to the 
internet. However, hate speech on the internet is an international 
problem and international solutions are being worked on.189  
The recommendations made in this paper are not overbearing, and will 
not infringe unfairly on reasonable citizens rights. It must be 
remembered that hate speech laws will not stop racism; they are not a 
fix-all. For “[r]acist speech is a mere symptom of racism.”190 Public 
education of diverse values, tolerance and acceptance are also 
important. The international experience has demonstrated that hate 
speech legislation has had a minimal effect on speech as there has 
been no obvious chilling effect. The governments have not used such 
laws to restrict negative speech about the government as was feared in 
the submissions to the select committee.191192 There has been no 
‘horrible result’, in the international experience. The fears raised in many 
of the Select Committee submissions that objected to new hate speech 
legislation have simply not materialized where such laws have been 
enacted. The recommendations contained herein would round out New 
Zealand’s current legislation and make it more logical and coherent.  
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